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Cited by 145Political Philosophy and EthicsPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryIncome, Poverty, and Inequality

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From Global Poverty to Global Equality: A Philosophical Exploration

Gilabert, Pablo·2012·Oxford University Press eBooks
DOI 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199639717.001.0001
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Abstract

Do we have positive duties to help others in need or are our moral duties only negative, focused on not harming them? Are any of the former duties of justice that respond to enforceable rights? Is their scope global? Should we aim for global equality besides the eradication of severe global poverty? Is a humanist approach to egalitarian distribution based on rights that all human beings as such have defensible, or must egalitarian distribution be seen in an associativist way, as tracking existing frameworks such as statehood and economic interdependence? Are the eradication of global poverty and the achievement of global equality practically feasible or are they hopelessly utopian wishes? This book argues that there are basic positive duties of justice to help eradicate severe global poverty, that global egalitarian principles are also reasonable even if they cannot be fully realized in the short term, and that there are dynamic duties to enhance the feasibility of the transition from global poverty to global equality in the face of nonideal circumstances such as the absence of robust international institutions and the lack of a strong ethos of cosmopolitan solidarity. The very notion of feasibility is crucial for normative reasoning, but has received little explicit philosophical discussion. This book offers a systematic exploration of that concept as well as of its application to global justice. It also arbitrates the current debate between humanist and associativist accounts of the scope of distributive justice. Drawing on moral contractualism (the view that we ought to follow the principles that no one could reasonably reject), this book provides a novel defense of humanism, challenges several versions of associativism (which remains the most popular view among political philosophers), and seeks to integrate the insights underlying both views.

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Metadata

Authors
Gilabert, P.
Corresponding author
Gilabert, Pablo
ORCID
Gilabert, Pablo
Venue
Oxford University Press eBooks
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Published
2012-03-15
DOI
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199639717.001.0001
OpenAlex
W4229742001
Cited by
145
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 48 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 2
FWCI
10.10
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Income, Poverty, and Inequality
Keywords
global poverty, global equality, positive duties, negative duties, global justice, feasibility, cosmopolitanism, human rights, non-ideal theory, international institutions, statehood, economic interdependence

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