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Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind
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Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mind Intrinsic content, active memory and the extended mindA ndy C lark Clark and Chalmers (1998) defend the view that the human mind need not be in the human head.To speak more carefully, they defend the view that the material vehicles 1 of cognition can be spread out across brain, body and certain aspects of the physical environment itself.Critics of this view (which has become known as the 'extended mind hypothesis', henceforth EM) have pointed to the supposedly intrinsic nature of the contents carried by inner biological vehicles.External, non-biological vehicles, such critics claim, are not (at least in any typical human case) similarly endowed, and thus fail to exhibit one of the key 'marks of the cognitive' (Adams and Aizawa 2001: 48).I shall argue that this response is mistaken.First, though I shall not dwell upon this, it is unclear that there is any such thing as intrinsic content anyway.Second, in so far as the notion is intelligible at all, there is no reason to believe that external, non-biological structures are incapable of supporting such content.And third, even if they were incapable of so doing, this would not actually compromise the case for the extended mind.The worry about intrinsic content, I conclude, is multiply fatally flawed.Despite all this, there are some related and legitimate worries that may well be informing the unease expressed by Adams, Aizawa and others.2 The paper ends by briefly discussing these worries, pointing to a possible solution, and then gesturing at the larger picture of the extended mind and its place in nature.The original argument for EM took the form of some thought experiments, a principle meant to command rational assent, and a battery of 1 It is important, in considering the issues to be discussed, to maintain a distinction between vehicles and contents.Possessing a contentful mental state is most plausibly a property of a whole active system (perhaps in some historical and/or environmental context).Within that system, certain enduring material aspects may play a special role in enabling the system to possess (whether occurently or dispositionally) a given mental state.These material aspects are the vehicle of the content.The Extended Mind hypothesis is really a hypothesis about extended vehicles, vehicles that may be distributed across brain, body and world.We conflate vehicles and contents, as Dennett (1991) and Hurley (1998) stress, at our philosophical and scientific peril. 2 Some related critical treatments include O'Brian 1998, Dartnall (in press) and Weiskopf (submitted).For a somewhat different critical angle, see Sterelny (in Press).
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Cites
Hutchins, E. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/1881.001.0001 · Cited by 10,801
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 · Cited by 6,333
Self-citationCoding of modified body schema during tool use by macaque postcentral neurones
lriki, A., Tanaka, M., & Iwamura, Y. (1996) · NeuroReport · doi:10.1097/00001756-199610020-00010 · Cited by 1,274
Cited by
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension
Clark, A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195333213.001.0001 · Cited by 2,201
Self-citationThe Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition
(2014) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315775845 · Cited by 907
Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind
Rupert, R. D. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379457.001.0001 · Cited by 411
Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process
Sutton, J. (2010) · The Extended Mind · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0009 · Cited by 396
The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering
Sutton, J., Harris, C. B., Keil, P. G., & Barnier, A. J. (2010) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9182-y · Cited by 377
Metadata
- Authors
- Clark, A.
- Venue
- Analysis
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2005-01-01
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-11
- ISSN
- 0003-2638 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8284
- OpenAlex
- W2012953331
- Cited by
- 204
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 5.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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