Prediction and Explanation in Historical Natural Science
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In earlier work (Cleland [2001], [2002]), I sketched an account of the structure and justification of ‘prototypical’ historical natural science that distinguishes it from ‘classical’ experimental science. This article expands upon this work, focusing upon the close connection between explanation and justification in the historical natural sciences. I argue that confirmation and disconfirmation in these fields depends primarily upon the explanatory (versus predictive or retrodictive) success or failure of hypotheses vis-à-vis empirical evidence. The account of historical explanation that I develop is a version of common cause explanation. Common cause explanation has long been vindicated by appealing to the principle of the common cause. Many philosophers of science (e.g., Sober and Tucker) find this principle problematic, however, because they believe that it is either purely methodological or strictly metaphysical. I defend a third possibility: the principle of the common cause derives its justification from a physically pervasive time asymmetry of causation (a.k.a. the asymmetry of overdetermination). I argue that explicating the principle of the common cause in terms of the asymmetry of overdetermination illuminates some otherwise puzzling features of the practices of historical natural scientists. 1 Introduction 2 The Methodology of Historical Natural Science 3 Justification in Historical Natural Science 3.1 Prediction 3.2 Adequate historical explanations are not potential predictions 3.3 The centrality of common cause explanation 4 Common Cause Explanation and the Asymmetry of Overdetermination 4.1 The priority of common cause over separate causes explanations 4.2 The threat of information degrading processes
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Woese, C. R. (1987) · Microbiological Reviews · doi:10.1128/mr.51.2.221-271.1987 · Cited by 5,042
Studies in the Logic of Explanation
Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, P. (1948) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/286983 · Cited by 3,174 · cited 1×
“While it is tempting to suppose that they are somehow related—Horwich ([1989]) and Albert ([2000]), for instance, attribute them to the initial conditions at the time of the ‘big bang’—the important point for our purposes is that there is overwhelming empirical evidence for both the second law of thermodynamics and th…”
BackgroundEvidence for life on Earth before 3,800 million years ago
Mojzsis, S. J., Arrhenius, G., McKeegan, K. D., Harrison, T. M., Nutman, A. P., & Friend, C. R. L. (1996) · Nature · doi:10.1038/384055a0 · Cited by 1,370
Fossilized melanosomes and the colour of Cretaceous dinosaurs and birds
Zhang, F., Kearns, S. L., Orr, P. J., Benton, M. J., Zhou, Z., Johnson, D., Xu, X., & Wang, X. (2010) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature08740 · Cited by 303
Parallel adaptations to high temperatures in the Archaean eon
Boussau, B., Blanquart, S., Necsulea, A., Lartillot, N., & Gouy, M. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature07393 · Cited by 242 · cited 2×
“that LUCA closely resembled contemporary bacteria; the question of whether it was hyperthermophilic (heat loving) or preferred more moderate temperatures is still being debated (Boussau et al. [2008]). As Carl Woese ([1987]) points out, LUCA is much too sophisticated biologically to represent the earliest form of life…”
BackgroundVinther, J., Briggs, D. E. G., Prum, R. O., & Saranathan, V. (2008) · Biology Letters · doi:10.1098/rsbl.2008.0302 · Cited by 204
Cited by
Roux, C., Bucht, R., Crispino, F., De Forest, P., Lennard, C., Margot, P., Miranda, M. D., NicDaeid, N., Ribaux, O., Ross, A., et al. (2022) · Forensic Science International · doi:10.1016/j.forsciint.2022.111182 · Cited by 195
Metadata
- Authors
- Cleland, C. E.
- Venue
- The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2011-09-01
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 551-582
- ISSN
- 0007-0882 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-3537
- OpenAlex
- W2126031937
- Cited by
- 216
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 82.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.