Addressing Beacon re-identification attacks: quantification and mitigation of privacy risks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH) created the Beacon Project as a means of testing the willingness of data holders to share genetic data in the simplest technical context—a query for the presence of a specified nucleotide at a given position within a chromosome. Each participating site (or “beacon”) is responsible for assuring that genomic data are exposed through the Beacon service only with the permission of the individual to whom the data pertains and in accordance with the GA4GH policy and standards. While recognizing the inference risks associated with large-scale data aggregation, and the fact that some beacons contain sensitive phenotypic associations that increase privacy risk, the GA4GH adjudged the risk of re-identification based on the binary yes/no allele-presence query responses as acceptable. However, recent work demonstrated that, given a beacon with specific characteristics (including relatively small sample size and an adversary who possesses an individual’s whole genome sequence), the individual’s membership in a beacon can be inferred through repeated queries for variants present in the individual’s genome. In this paper, we propose three practical strategies for reducing re-identification risks in beacons. The first two strategies manipulate the beacon such that the presence of rare alleles is obscured; the third strategy budgets the number of accesses per user for each individual genome. Using a beacon containing data from the 1000 Genomes Project, we demonstrate that the proposed strategies can effectively reduce re-identification risk in beacon-like datasets.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The International HapMap Project
†The International HapMap Consortium, Genotyping centres: Baylor College of Medicine and ParAllele BioScience, Gibbs, R. A., Belmont, J. W., Hardenbol, P., Willis, T. D., Yu, F., Chinese HapMap Consortium, Yang, H., Ch'ang, L.-Y., et al. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02168 · Cited by 6,057
Evolution and functional impact of rare coding variation from deep sequencing of human exomes
Tennessen, J. A., Bigham, A. W., O’Connor, T. D., Fu, W., Kenny, E. E., Gravel, S., McGee, S., Do, R., Liu, X., Jun, G., et al. (2012) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1219240 · Cited by 1,613 · cited 1×
“5% of the population.(5) As a result, it is unlikely that any single institution will hold enough data to achieve sufficient statistical power in studying any particular condition.”
BackgroundSelf-citationHomer, N., Szelinger, S., Redman, M., Duggan, D., Tembe, W., Muehling, J., Pearson, J. V., Stephan, D. A., Nelson, S. F., & Craig, D. W. (2008) · PLoS Genetics · doi:10.1371/journal.pgen.1000167 · Cited by 1,221
A Systematic Review of Re-Identification Attacks on Health Data
El Emam, K., Jonker, E., Arbuckle, L., & Malin, B. (2011) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0028071 · Cited by 427
Privacy risks from genomic data-sharing beacons
Shringarpure, S. S., & Bustamante, C. D. (2015) · The American Journal of Human Genetics · doi:10.1016/j.ajhg.2015.09.010 · Cited by 211
Self-citation
Cited by
On Utility and Privacy in Synthetic Genomic Data
Oprisanu, B., Ganev, G., & De Cristofaro, E. (2022) · Proceedings 2022 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2022.24092 · Cited by 23
COLLAGENE enables privacy-aware federated and collaborative genomic data analysis
Li, W., Kim, M., Zhang, K., Chen, H., Jiang, X., & Harmanci, A. (2023) · Genome Biology · doi:10.1186/s13059-023-03039-z · Cited by 16
Self-citationSegar, N., & Vijayan, V. (2026) · Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.3389/frai.2026.1804943 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Raisaro, J. L., Tramèr, F., Ji, Z., Bu, D., Zhao, Y., Carey, K., Lloyd, D., Sofia, H., Baker, D., Flicek, P., Shringarpure, S., Bustamante, C., Wang, S., Jiang, X., Ohno-Machado, L., Tang, H., Wang, X., & Hubaux, J.-P.
- Venue
- Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2017-02-20
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 799-805
- ISSN
- 1067-5027 (ISSN-L)
- 1527-974X
- OpenAlex
- W2573423285
- Cited by
- 86
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 7.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Addressing Beacon re-identification attacks: quantification and mitigation of privacy risks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/jamia/ocw167
- The paper
- Raisaro, J. L., Tramèr, F., Ji, Z., Bu, D., Zhao, Y., Carey, K., Lloyd, D., Sofia, H., Baker, D., Flicek, P., Shringarpure, S., Bustamante, C., Wang, S., Jiang, X., Ohno-Machado, L., Tang, H., Wang, X., & Hubaux, J.-P. (2017). Addressing Beacon re-identification attacks: quantification and mitigation of privacy risks. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association. https://doi.org/10.1093/jamia/ocw167
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.