The Economics of Scientific Misconduct
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article presents a model of the research and publication process that analyzes why scientists commit fraud and how fraud can be detected and prevented. In the model, authors are asymmetrically informed about the success of their projects and can fraudulently manipulate their results. We show, first, that the types of scientific frauds that are observed are unlikely to be representative of the overall amount of malfeasance; also, star scientists are more likely to misbehave but less likely to be caught than average scientists. Second, a reduction in fraud verification costs may not lead to a reduction of misconduct episodes but rather to a change in the type of research that is performed. Third, a strong “publish or perish” pressure may reduce, and not increase, scientific misconduct because it motivates more scrutiny. Finally, a more active role of editors in checking for misconduct does not always provide additional deterrence.
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“This is possible due to the research processes information asymmetry22 that can exist on papers when it comes to authorship.”
From Identifying fabricated networks within authorship-for-sale enterprises (2024) · cites this paper as [22]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lacetera, N., & Zirulia, L.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Bocconi University (IT)
- Corresponding author
- Lacetera, N.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-10-20
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 568-603
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- 8756-6222
- OpenAlex
- W2014333102
- Cited by
- 5
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2015: 1 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 3.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- cc-by-nc-nd
- Locations
- The Journal of Law Economics and Organization (publishedVersion)
- TSpace (University of Toronto) (acceptedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Archivio istituzionale della ricerca (Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Education › Academic integrity and plagiarism
- Social Sciences › Library and Information Sciences › Academic Publishing and Open Access
- Social Sciences › Library and Information Sciences › Publishing and Scholarly Communication
- Keywords
- research misconduct, scientific fraud, fraud detection, fraud prevention, information asymmetry, publication process, publish or perish, journal editors, deterrence, star scientists, research incentives
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