The DOI matches its Crossref record; 393 of the 393 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Political Economy of the Investment Treaty Regime
Open accessAbstract
Investment treaties are some of the most controversial but least understood instruments of global economic governance. Public interest in investment treaty arbitration is growing, and some developed and developing countries are beginning to revisit their investment treaty policies. This book synthesizes and advances the growing literature on the investment treaty regime by integrating legal, economic, and political perspectives. Based on an analysis of the substantive and procedural rights conferred by investment treaties, the book asks four basic questions. What are the costs and benefits of investment treaties for investors, states, and other stakeholders? Why did developed and developing countries sign the treaties? Why should private arbitrators be allowed to review public regulations passed by states? And what is the relationship between the investment treaty regime and the broader regime complex that governs international investment?
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Metadata
- Authors
- Bonnitcha, J., Skovgaard Poulsen, L. N., & Waibel, M.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2017-07-20
- OpenAlex
- W2601890454
- Cited by
- 345
- References
- 393
- FWCI
- 42.38
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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