“Case Comment–United States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2005): A Collateral Attack on the Legal Maxim That Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Is Unquantifiable?”
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Abstract
There is a well-settled maxim that the standard of persuasion in criminal trials—proof beyond a reasonable doubt—is unquantifiable. However, the usual reasons given for the unquantifiability of reasonable doubt are unsatisfactory; and a recent case, United States v. Copeland, serves as a reminder that strong considerations favour quantification of at least some standards of persuasion. This comment attempts to bring greater clarity to the question of the advantages and disadvantages of some form of quantification of the reasonable doubt standard.
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“The application of criminal justice in the United States revolves, in large part, around the ways in which jurors interpret the vague probabilistic standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (Tillers and Gottfried 2006).”
From The Value of Precision in Probability Assessment: Evidence from a Large-Scale Geopolitical Forecasting Tournament (2018) · cites this paper as Tillers and Gottfried 2006
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Metadata
- Authors
- Tillers, P., & Gottfried, J.
- Affiliations
- Yeshiva University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Tillers, P.
- Venue
- Law, Probability and Risk
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2007-03-03
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 135-157
- ISSN
- 1470-8396 (ISSN-L)
- 1470-840X
- OpenAlex
- W2128720276
- Cited by
- 36
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 25.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Law Probability and Risk (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Law › Legal processes and jurisprudence
- Social Sciences › Law › Criminal Law and Evidence
- Social Sciences › Law › Jury Decision Making Processes
- Keywords
- proof beyond a reasonable doubt, standard of proof, collateral attack, criminal evidence, evidentiary standards
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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