The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Constitution Is Not Identity
Abstract
Suppose that a statue of Goliath is made by fusing together two appropriately shaped pieces of clay and that after a few minutes, the artisan, frustrated with his work, dissolves the statue in a solvent which destroys clay and statue alike. Then a natural thing to say is that the careers of the statue and the lump or piece of clay which made it up are entirely coincident. The statue and the piece of clay came into being at the same time and ceased to be at the same time. Throughout their respective careers, the piece of clay constituted the statue. Had the artisan despaired only of the arms and calves of Goliath and dissolved only them, replacing them with new pieces of appropriately molded clay, then we should say that distinct but not wholly distinct pieces of clay constituted the statue of Goliath over its lifetime. In this second case we naturally conclude that the statue is not absolutely identical with the whole piece of clay which originally constituted it, since the piece arguably did not survive the dissolving of significant parts of it, while the statue clearly did survive the dissolving; as is evidenced by the fact that the statue had new arms and calves attached to it. So also, it seems natural to conclude that even in the first case in which the original piece of clay constituted the statue throughout its entire career, the statue is not absolutely identical with the clay, since the statue could have survived certain changes which the piece of clay would not have survived, e.g. the changes described in the second case. Philosophers have gone to some lengths to resist this last conclusion. Thus David Lewis, Alan Gibbard, Anil Gupta and Denis Robinson all allege that something special about modal predication invalidates the argument to non-identity in the case of complete coincidence.' Concentrating on Lewis's way of putting the point, since it fits neatly into a familiar systematic way of thinking of modality, the situation is supposed&to be as follows.2 If the term Lumpl names the piece of clay which makes up the statue Goliath, the aim is to defend
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Citations
Cites
Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic
Lewis, D. K., & The Journal of Philosophy, I. (1968) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024555 · Cited by 1,078
Parthood and Identity Across Time
Thomson, J. J. (1983) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2026004 · Cited by 388
Unger, P., & Philosophy Documentation Center (1980) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00416.x · Cited by 346
Kaplan, D. (1975) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2024635 · Cited by 310
Is There a Problem About Persistence?
Johnston, M., & Forbes, G. (1987) · Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume · doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/61.1.107 · Cited by 274
Self-citationGILL, R. R. R. (1982) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1982.tb00434.x · Cited by 132
Williams, D. C. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198810384.003.0003 · Cited by 71
Cited by
Merricks, T. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199245363.001.0001 · Cited by 811
Koslicki, K. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199539895.001.0001 · Cited by 379
Construction area (no hard hat required)
Bennett, K. (2011) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9703-8 · Cited by 252
Metadata
- Authors
- JOHNSTON, M.
- Venue
- Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1992
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 401
- Pages
- 89-106
- ISSN
- 0026-4423 (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2113
- OpenAlex
- W1992562034
- Cited by
- 362
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 2.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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