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Common computations for metacognition and meta-metacognition

Open access
Zheng, Yunxuan, Recht, Samuel, Rahnev, Dobromir · 2023 · Neuroscience of Consciousness

Abstract

Abstract Recent evidence shows that people have the meta-metacognitive ability to evaluate their metacognitive judgments of confidence. However, it is unclear whether meta-metacognitive judgments are made by a different system and rely on a separate set of computations compared to metacognitive judgments. To address this question, we asked participants (N = 36) to perform a perceptual decision-making task and provide (i) an object-level, Type-1 response about the identity of the stimulus; (ii) a metacognitive, Type-2 response (low/high) regarding their confidence in their Type-1 decision; and (iii) a meta-metacognitive, Type-3 response (low/high) regarding the quality of their Type-2 rating. We found strong evidence for the existence of Type-3, meta-metacognitive ability. In a separate condition, participants performed an identical task with only a Type-1 response followed by a Type-2 response given on a 4-point scale. We found that the two conditions produced equivalent results such that the combination of binary Type-2 and binary Type-3 responses acts similar to a 4-point Type-2 response. Critically, while Type-2 evaluations were subject to metacognitive noise, Type-3 judgments were made at no additional cost. These results suggest that it is unlikely that there is a distinction between Type-2 and Type-3 systems (metacognition and meta-metacognition) in perceptual decision-making and, instead, a single system can be flexibly adapted to produce both Type-2 and Type-3 evaluations recursively.

Overview

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## TL;DR

This study tested whether meta-metacognitive judgments (Type-3) in perception are computed by a different system than metacognitive judgments (Type-2). Across a perceptual task in 36 participants, the authors found equivalent behavioral effects for a 4-point Type-2 rating and a binary Type-2 + Type-3 format, suggesting a common computation.

## Key findings

  • In the Type-2/Type-3 condition, high Type-3 ratings were associated with higher metacognitive efficiency (Mratio) than low Type-3 ratings: mean = 0.96 vs 0.46, t(35) = 4.39, P < .001.
  • In the Type-2-only condition, after converting the 4-point confidence scale into pseudo-Type-2/Type-3 ratings, high Type-3 ratings again had higher Mratio than low ratings: mean = 0.98 vs 0.45, t(33) = 4.90, P < .001.
  • The Mratio difference between high and low Type-3 judgments did not differ between conditions: Type-2-only mean difference = 0.527, Type-2/Type-3 mean difference = 0.532, BF01 = 5.439; linear mixed models also found no task-condition effect or interaction.
  • Type-1 accuracy and Type-1 decision RT both tracked confidence similarly across conditions: higher confidence meant higher accuracy and faster RT, with no main effect of task condition and no confidence × condition interaction. The authors also found no extra noise for Type-3 judgments: d' decreased with distance from the decision criterion in both conditions, with equivalent slopes (BF01 = 10.084).

## Methods

  • 36 adult participants remained after exclusions from an initial 40 recruited on Prolific; each completed 400 trials in each of two conditions, with condition order counterbalanced across participants.
  • The task was a perceptual dot-counting judgment: participants chose which of two black squares contained more white dots, after which they gave either a 4-point Type-2 confidence rating (“Type-2-only”) or binary Type-2 plus binary Type-3 ratings (“Type-2/Type-3”).
  • Analyses used signal detection theory measures (d', meta-d', Mratio) and linear mixed-effects models with participant as a random effect; the authors also compared Type-1 accuracy, Type-1 RT, and d' as a function of confidence criteria.

## Limitations

  • The paper states that its conclusions are specific to the perceptual domain and may not generalize to other domains such as memory or theory of mind.
  • The authors note that the study cannot completely falsify the possibility of separate Type-2 and Type-3 systems performing the same computations in this task; they frame the unified-system account as the most parsimonious hypothesis.
  • Evident from the text: the task used a single simple perceptual discrimination with only one stimulus type (100 vs 85 dots), so the evidence is narrow in scope.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/nc/niad023

Cites

44 of 44 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

18 tests recomputed · 0 with the reported and recomputed p on opposite sides of .05

Figures

Figure 1. Separate systems vs. a unified system for Type-2 and Type-3 judgments. (a) Depiction of distinct systems for Type-2 metacognition and Type-3 meta-metacognition. (b) Depiction of a single and unified system for Type-2 and Type-3 judgments. (c) A mapping between Type-2 metacognitive judgments given on a 4-point scale and a combination of binary Type-2 metacognitive judgment followed by a binary Type-3 meta-metacognitive judgment
Figure 1. Separate systems vs. a unified system for Type-2 and Type-3 judgments. (a) Depiction of distinct systems for Type-2 metacognition and Type-3 meta-metacognition. (b) Depiction of a single and unified system for Type-2 and Type-3 judgments. (c) A mapping between Type-2 metacognitive judgments given on a 4-point scale and a combination of binary Type-2 metacognitive judgment followed by a binary Type-3 meta-metacognitive judgmentCC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2. Task paradigm. (a) Type-2-only condition. Participants judged which of two squares contained more dots. On each trial, participants indicated their decision confidence (metacognitive rating) using a 4-point scale. (b) Type-2/Type-3 condition. Participants completed the same dot task. However, instead of giving confidence on a 4-point scale, they provided a confidence rating (Type-2 judgment) on a 2-point scale and then a meta-metacognitive rating (Type-3 judgments) again on a 2-point scale (low/high)
Figure 2. Task paradigm. (a) Type-2-only condition. Participants judged which of two squares contained more dots. On each trial, participants indicated their decision confidence (metacognitive rating) using a 4-point scale. (b) Type-2/Type-3 condition. Participants completed the same dot task. However, instead of giving confidence on a 4-point scale, they provided a confidence rating (Type-2 judgment) on a 2-point scale and then a meta-metacognitive rating (Type-3 judgments) again on a 2-point scale (low/high)CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3. Equivalent results in Type-2/Type-3 and Type-2-only conditions. (a) We found higher metacognitive efficiency (Mratio) in trials with high vs. low Type-3 responses. Critically, equivalent results were obtained in both the Type-2/Type-3 condition and the Type-2-only condition (after rating conversion where the 4-point Type-2 ratings are turned into a type-3 rating combination). (b) Accuracy associated with each confidence rating in the Type-2-only condition and the converted ratings in the Type-2/Type-3 condition. Accuracy increased with confidence to the same extent in both conditions. (c) RT associated with each confidence rating in the Type-2-only condition and the converted ratings in the Type-2/Type-3 condition. RT decreased with confidence to the same extent in both conditions. (d) Sensitivity (d') associated with each decision and confidence criterion. Sensitivity decreases for criteria further away from the decision criterion, as expected from the existence of signal-dependent metacognitive noise (Shekhar and Rahnev 2021b). Critically, the decrease is equivalent for the Type-2-only and the Type-2/Type-3 conditions, indicating the absence of additional “meta-metacognitive noise” that may be expected from a separate Type-3 system. Here, “confidence criterion n /n + 1” indicates the confidence criterion that separates the ratings n and n + 1. n.s., not significant; ***, P < .001
Figure 3. Equivalent results in Type-2/Type-3 and Type-2-only conditions. (a) We found higher metacognitive efficiency (Mratio) in trials with high vs. low Type-3 responses. Critically, equivalent results were obtained in both the Type-2/Type-3 condition and the Type-2-only condition (after rating conversion where the 4-point Type-2 ratings are turned into a type-3 rating combination). (b) Accuracy associated with each confidence rating in the Type-2-only condition and the converted ratings in the Type-2/Type-3 condition. Accuracy increased with confidence to the same extent in both conditions. (c) RT associated with each confidence rating in the Type-2-only condition and the converted ratings in the Type-2/Type-3 condition. RT decreased with confidence to the same extent in both conditions. (d) Sensitivity (d') associated with each decision and confidence criterion. Sensitivity decreases for criteria further away from the decision criterion, as expected from the existence of signal-dependent metacognitive noise (Shekhar and Rahnev 2021b). Critically, the decrease is equivalent for the Type-2-only and the Type-2/Type-3 conditions, indicating the absence of additional “meta-metacognitive noise” that may be expected from a separate Type-3 system. Here, “confidence criterion n /n + 1” indicates the confidence criterion that separates the ratings n and n + 1. n.s., not significant; ***, P < .001CC BY · PubMed Central

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Statistics that don’t add up

Each reported p-value recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom.

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Statistics recomputed

Every reported test result, recomputed from its test statistic and degrees of freedom. A result shows as not adding up only once an independent check has confirmed it.

  • Doesn’t add upF(1, 247.56) = 4.361reported p = .039 · recomputed p = .038

    “F(1, 247.56) = 4.361, p = .039”

  • Doesn’t add upF(1, 252) = 1.52reported p = .21 · recomputed p = .219

    “F(1, 252) = 1.520, p = .210”

  • Consistentt(35) = 4.39reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “t(35) = 4.39, p < .001”

  • Consistentt(33) = 4.9reported p < .001 · recomputed p < .001

    “t(33) = 4.90, p < .001”

  • Consistentt(55.655) = 1.46reported p = .15 · recomputed p = .150

    “t(55.655) = 1.460, p = .150”

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Metadata

Authors
Zheng, Y., Recht, S., & Rahnev, D.
Affiliations
  • Georgia Institute of Technology (US)
  • University of Oxford (GB)
Corresponding author
Zheng, Yunxuan
Venue
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Published
2023-01-01
Volume
2023
Issue
1
Pages
niad023-niad023
ISSN
2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4389262286
Cited by
15
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 5 · 2024: 6
FWCI
2.24
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • Office of Naval Research (N00014-20-1-2622)
  • National Institute of Health (R01MH119189)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
Keywords
metacognition, confidence judgments, perceptual decision making, metacognitive skills, metacognitive confidence

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Zheng, Y., Recht, S., & Rahnev, D. (2023). Common computations for metacognition and meta-metacognition. Neuroscience of Consciousness. https://doi.org/10.1093/nc/niad023

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