Cited by 0Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEmbodied and Extended CognitionNeural dynamics and brain function

From structure to experience: a Spinozist framework for consciousness rooted in critical brain dynamics

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Algom, Inbal, Nachshoni, Yehonatan, Salti, Moti, Shriki, Oren·2026·Neuroscience of Consciousness

Abstract

The study of consciousness is divided between mechanistic accounts that overlook subjective experience and phenomenological approaches limited to neural correlates. We propose a unified framework by grounding our ConCrit model of consciousness and critical brain dynamics within Spinoza’s ontological monism. Spinoza’s principle of psycho-physical parallelism—mind and body as attributes of one substance—provides a metaphysical basis to dissolve the explanatory gap between neural processes and lived experience. Within this framework, three properties which are maximized near criticality correspond, under Spinoza’s parallelism, to mental dimensions: entropy corresponds to experiential richness—the diversity of idea under the attribute of Thought, internal susceptibility to reflexive capacity or degrees of autonomy, and scale-free dynamics to the structural alignment with the common order of nature that, under the attribute of Thought, is expressed in adequate ideas. Thus, we propose that brain activity near criticality under the attribute of Extension is the very same phenomenon that, under the attribute of Thought, is conscious experience. This synthesis reinterprets leading theories—including Integrated Information Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, and the Entropic Brain Hypothesis—as complementary views of a shared underlying reality. By situating ConCrit within Spinoza’s monism, we argue that consciousness is not emergent or epiphenomenal but the parallel manifestation of universal organizational principles, offering a conceptually unified and interpretively transparent framework for neuroscience.

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Authors
Algom, I., Nachshoni, Y., Salti, M., & Shriki, O.
Affiliations
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (IL)
Corresponding author
Shriki, Oren
Venue
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Published
2026
Volume
2026
Issue
1
Pages
niag066-niag066
ISSN
2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W7223707355
Cited by
0
References
4
FWCI
0.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
Keywords
consciousness, Spinoza, ontological monism, explanatory gap, integrated information theory, global neuronal workspace theory, emergent consciousness, scale-free dynamics, entropy (information theory), subjective experience, mind-brain relationship

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