From structure to experience: a Spinozist framework for consciousness rooted in critical brain dynamics
Open accessAbstract
The study of consciousness is divided between mechanistic accounts that overlook subjective experience and phenomenological approaches limited to neural correlates. We propose a unified framework by grounding our ConCrit model of consciousness and critical brain dynamics within Spinoza’s ontological monism. Spinoza’s principle of psycho-physical parallelism—mind and body as attributes of one substance—provides a metaphysical basis to dissolve the explanatory gap between neural processes and lived experience. Within this framework, three properties which are maximized near criticality correspond, under Spinoza’s parallelism, to mental dimensions: entropy corresponds to experiential richness—the diversity of idea under the attribute of Thought, internal susceptibility to reflexive capacity or degrees of autonomy, and scale-free dynamics to the structural alignment with the common order of nature that, under the attribute of Thought, is expressed in adequate ideas. Thus, we propose that brain activity near criticality under the attribute of Extension is the very same phenomenon that, under the attribute of Thought, is conscious experience. This synthesis reinterprets leading theories—including Integrated Information Theory, Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, and the Entropic Brain Hypothesis—as complementary views of a shared underlying reality. By situating ConCrit within Spinoza’s monism, we argue that consciousness is not emergent or epiphenomenal but the parallel manifestation of universal organizational principles, offering a conceptually unified and interpretively transparent framework for neuroscience.
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Cites
The entropic brain - revisited
Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2018) · Neuropharmacology · doi:10.1016/j.neuropharm.2018.03.010 · Cited by 522 · see citing works
What Geometric Visual Hallucinations Tell Us about the Visual Cortex
Bressloff, P. C., Cowan, J. D., Golubitsky, M., Thomas, P. J., & Wiener, M. C. (2002) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/089976602317250861 · Cited by 290 · see citing works
Lamme, V. A. F. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0344 · Cited by 194 · see citing works
Facing up to the hard question of consciousness
Dennett, D. C. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0342 · Cited by 149 · see citing works
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- Authors
- Algom, I., Nachshoni, Y., Salti, M., & Shriki, O.
- Affiliations
- Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (IL)
- Corresponding author
- Shriki, Oren
- Venue
- Neuroscience of Consciousness
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2026
- Volume
- 2026
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- niag066-niag066
- ISSN
- 2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC13704772
- OpenAlex
- W7223707355
- Cited by
- 0
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Keywords
- consciousness, Spinoza, ontological monism, explanatory gap, integrated information theory, global neuronal workspace theory, emergent consciousness, scale-free dynamics, entropy (information theory), subjective experience, mind-brain relationship
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