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Analogy-Making, Fluid Concepts, and Brain Mechanisms
Abstract
How can one best study human cognition? The assumption underlying this paper is that it is by creating a computer model. Accordingly, this paper is about such a computer model. And what is the crux of human cognition? The assumption underlying this paper is that it is human concepts. Accordingly, a rudimentary model of human concepts is found at the core of the model presented herein. And what is the crucial property of human concepts that makes them so subtle and hard to model on a computer? The assumption underlying this paper is that it is that they are fluid. What, then, is conceptual fluidity-or, more generally, mental fluidity (the collective result of the fluidity of all the concepts in a mind)? The phenomenon is complex and elusive, and therefore more easily demonstrated by example than by definition. Accordingly, the paper opens with a presentation of various examples of mental fluidity, and then explains the reasons underlying the domain selected for the model.
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Cited by 6
Metadata
- Authors
- Hofstadter, D. R.
- Corresponding author
- Hofstadter, Douglas R
- Venue
- Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 1996-11-28
- Pages
- 195-247
- OpenAlex
- W4388340137
- Cited by
- 6
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cognitive Computing and Networks
- Social Sciences › Linguistics and Language › Language, Metaphor, and Cognition
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Categorization, perception, and language
- Keywords
- analogy-making, human concept, neural mechanisms, conceptual change
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How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Analogy-Making, Fluid Concepts, and Brain Mechanisms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/oso/9780198235941.003.0012
- The paper
- Hofstadter, D. R. (1996). Analogy-Making, Fluid Concepts, and Brain Mechanisms. Connectionism, Concepts, and Folk Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198235941.003.0012
