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The Possibility of Practical Reason
Abstract
This volume contains the work that I have done in the philosophy of action since completing the book Practical Reflection. One of the papers, ‘Epistemic Freedom,’ is an expanded version of a chapter in the book; it was written after the book went to press, though it was published first. I have included it here because I think that it significantly improves on the corresponding portions of the book. One or two of the other papers are attempts to build upon or renovate the theory set down in the book, but most of them are attempts to dig beneath it. Without even referring to that theory, I have tried to unearth more fundamental reasons for wanting a theory of its general form—reasons for thinking that there ought to be a theory of its kind.
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Citations
Cited by
Self-exposure and exposure of the self: informational privacy and the presentation of identity
Shoemaker, D. W. (2010) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-009-9186-x · Cited by 33
Reinforcement learning and artificial agency
Butlin, P. (2024) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12458 · Cited by 40
Metadata
- Authors
- Velleman, J. D.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2000-10-19
- OpenAlex
- W2341178252
- Cited by
- 1,241
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 40.26
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
