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Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy
Abstract
Under the pressure of competitive rivalry, and in the apparent absence of effective barriers to entry, it would seem that the concentration of an industry’s output in a few firms could only derive from their superiority in producing and marketing products or in the superiority of a structure of industry in which there are only a few firms. In a world in which information and resource mobility can be secured only at a cost, an industry will become more concentrated under competitive conditions only if a differential advantage in expanding output develops in some firms. Such expansion will increase the degree of concentration at the same time that it increases the rate of return that these firms earn.
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Citations
Cited by
Jaffe, A. (1986) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w1815 · Cited by 2,808
Regulations, Market Structure, Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2003) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w9890 · Cited by 752
Regulations, Market Structure, Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Laeven, L., & Levine, R. (2004) · Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking · doi:10.1353/mcb.2004.0045 · Cited by 562
The Gains and Losses From Industrial Concentration
Peltzman, S. (1977) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0163 · Cited by 466
The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration
Peltzman, S. (1977) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466902 · Cited by 420
Metadata
- Authors
- Demsetz, H.
- Venue
- Resources, Firms, And Strategies
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 1997-12-11
- Pages
- 73-81
- OpenAlex
- W4388152401
- Cited by
- 190
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 11.04
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Demsetz, H. (1997). Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy. Resources, Firms, And Strategies. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198781806.003.0007
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.