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When Inner Speech Misleads
Abstract
This chapter examines whether and when the experience of inner speech can be inaccurate and thereby mislead the subject. It presents a view about the representational content of speech experience generally and then applies it to inner speech in particular. On such a view, speech experience typically presents us with far more than simply the low-level acoustic properties of speech: it conveys the relevant mental states of the (actual or hypothetical) speaker. Similarly, inner speech presents inner speakers with their own mental states. In light of this, inner speech can mislead either by presenting the subject with mental states they do not in fact have, or by presenting these mental states as belonging to another agent. The chapter reflects on the sorts of contexts in which either of these could occur.
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Inner speech has been considered a form of auditory imagery in which language is produced for functional ends, distinguishing it from imagining one's own speech.
“IS has been considered to be a form of auditory imagery in which language is produced for functional ends [5], thus distinguishing it from the less functionally significant process of imagining one's own speech [11].”
From Inner speech as language process and cognitive tool (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
Spontaneous inner speech is best understood as a functional linguistic act rather than an act that is simply imagined.
“One problem in interpreting these findings is that spontaneous IS is best understood as a functional linguistic act rather than an act that is simply imagined [11].”
From Inner speech as language process and cognitive tool (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
Understanding inner speech as a productive, active process rooted developmentally in social processes allows self-directed language to have functions beyond the transmission of information, such as regulating the self's activities analogously to how speech regulates the behavior of others.
“In particular, understanding IS as a productive, active process rooted developmentally in social processes (Box 1) allows self-directed language to have functions beyond the transmission of information: for example, in regulating the self's activities in an analogous way to how speech regulates the behavior of others [6,11]”
From Inner speech as language process and cognitive tool (2023) · cites this paper as [11]
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Inner speech as language process and cognitive tool
Fernyhough, C., & Borghi, A. M. (2023) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2023.08.014 · Cited by 101
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Metadata
- Authors
- Wilkinson, S., & Fernyhough, C.
- Venue
- Oxford Scholarship Online
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2018-10-18
- OpenAlex
- W2896311734
- Cited by
- 9
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2020: 1
- FWCI
- 0.29
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Representations and Identity
- Keywords
- inner speech, representational content, mental states, mental representation, self-knowledge, other minds
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