The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting
Abstract
This chapter explains why financial contracts often allow participants a measure of discretion as to whether to honor or repudiate them. An example is the “comfort letter” used by a parent company to assure the subsidiary’ s lenders that the parent will support it in financial distress. The British High Court recently ruled that comfort letters represent nothing more than a moral commitment (see American Banker, 6 June 1989), thereby reversing an earlier ruling by a lower court (see Rene Sacasas 1989). Another example is the “highly confident” letter with which the investment banker promises to provide credit, but the promise is typically not legally enforceable. Other examples of such contracts are discussed in Section III.
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Cites
Williamson, O. E. (1975) · Free Press eBooks · Cited by 9,210
Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange
Akerlof, G. A. (1982) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885099 · Cited by 3,210
Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation
CARTER, R., & MANASTER, S. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb02426.x · Cited by 2,441
The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts
Bull, C. (1987) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884685 · Cited by 649
Information reusability, competition and bank asset quality
Chan, Y.-S., Greenbaum, S. I., & Thakor, A. V. (1986) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/0378-4266(86)90008-7 · Cited by 267
Self-citationRisky Debt, Investment Incentives, and Reputation in a Sequential Equilibrium
John, K., & Nachman, D. C. (1985) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05012.x · Cited by 138
Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts
Allen, F., & Gale, D. M. (1992) · Economic Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01213250 · Cited by 108
Cited by
Kim, D. J., Ferrin, D. L., & Rao, H. R. (2008) · Decision Support Systems · doi:10.1016/j.dss.2007.07.001 · Cited by 3,613
Chapter 12 Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence
Levine, R. (2005) · Handbook of Economic Growth · doi:10.1016/s1574-0684(05)01012-9 · Cited by 2,889
Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?
Boot, A. W. A. (2000) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1006/jfin.2000.0282 · Cited by 2,354
Self-citationCan Relationship Banking Survive Competition?
Boot, A. W. A., & Thakor, A. V. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00223 · Cited by 1,590
Self-citationBank-Based or Market-Based Financial Systems: Which Is Better?
Levine, R. (2002) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1006/jfin.2002.0341 · Cited by 1,497
Metadata
- Authors
- Boot, A. W. A., Greenbaum, & Thakor, A. V.
- Venue
- Credit, Intermediation, and the Macroeconomy
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2004-03-25
- Pages
- 449-473
- OpenAlex
- W1558546286
- Cited by
- 526
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 119.48
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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