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The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions
Abstract
Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the semantics of knowledge-attributing sentences, not just among epistemologists but among philosophers of language seeking a general understanding of linguistic context sensitivity. Despite all this critical attention, however, we are as far from consensus as ever. If we have learned anything, it is that each of the standard views—invariantism, contextualism, and sen- sitive invariantism—has its Achilles heel: a residuum of facts about our use of knowledge attributions that it can explain only with special pleading. This is not surprising if, as I will argue, there is a grain of truth in each of these views.
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Cites
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Context
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Cited by
The Emotional Construction of Morals
Prinz, J. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571543.001.0001 · Cited by 679
MacFarlane, J. (2009) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9286-2 · Cited by 300
Self-citationMoral Disagreement and Moral Semantics
Khoo, J., & Knobe, J. (2018) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12151 · Cited by 82
Metadata
- Authors
- MacFarlane, J.
- Venue
- Oxford Studies In Epistemology
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressOxford
- Published
- 2005-12-01
- Pages
- 197-234
- OpenAlex
- W3175308615
- Cited by
- 350
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 184.01
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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