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Cited by 13Kantian Philosophy and Modern InterpretationsPhilosophical Ethics and TheoryEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 71 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Kant’s Derivation of the Moral “Ought” from a Metaphysical “Is”

Open access
Marshall, Colin·2022·The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds
DOI 10.1093/oso/9780199688265.003.0016
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Abstract

This chapter argues that Kant can be read as holding that “ought” judgments follow from certain “is” judgments by mere analysis. More specifically, an interpretation is defended according to which (1) Kant holds that “S ought to F” is analytically equivalent to “If, as it can and would were there no other influences on the will, S’s faculty of reason determined S’s willing, S would F” and (2) Kant’s notions of reason, the will, and freedom are all fundamentally non-normative. Not only does this reading have significant textual support, but it also sheds light on why Kant takes freedom and morality to mutually imply one another. Moreover, while Kant does take there to be a gap between moral judgments and empirical descriptive statements, that gap is consistent with the analysis in question. The author concludes by arguing that this rejection of the is-ought gap is not as philosophically implausible as it might seem, with a focus on G. E. Moore and Hume’s arguments for certain “gaps” between the normative and the non-normative.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

The chapter argues that Kant can be read as rejecting the is–ought gap in the strongest form: “S ought to F” is analytically equivalent to a counterfactual about what S would do if reason alone determined the will. It pairs this with the claim that Kant’s notions of reason, will, and freedom are fundamentally non-normative, and argues this reading is neither exegetically absurd nor philosophically uncharitable.

Key findings

  • The paper defends Analytic Equivalence: Kant holds that “S ought to F” is analytically equivalent to “If, as it can and would were there no other influences on the will, S’s faculty of reason determined S’s willing, S would F.”
  • It defends Non-Normative Freedom: Kant’s notions of reason, the will, and thereby freedom are all non-normative, though they can be used to define normative notions.
  • On this reading, a true “ought” judgment describes a metaphysical fact: the presence of competing motivational forces in a subject, specifically reason’s determination of the will in tension with sensible inclinations.
  • The interpretation is said to explain why Kant takes freedom and morality to mutually imply one another, and to allow Kant to accommodate many intuitions behind Hume’s and Moore’s statements of the is–ought gap while still rejecting the gap.

Methods

  • Philosophical/textual interpretation of Kant, relying most heavily on the *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, *Critique of Practical Reason*, and *Critique of the Power of Judgment*.
  • The argument proceeds by direct textual support for Analytic Equivalence, indirect interpretive motivation, defense of Non-Normative Freedom, replies to interpretive objections, and a tentative reply to the philosophical objection that denying the is–ought gap is uncharitable.
  • No empirical data, sample, or quantitative analysis is reported; the paper is a conceptual and exegetical argument.

Limitations

  • The author states that he does not try to rule out other readings of the relevant passages or show that his overall interpretation is better than extant interpretations; a proper comparison would take more than a single paper.
  • The author assumes Kant’s core views remained relatively stable across the decade in which the main texts were produced, though he notes it is unlikely they remained perfectly fixed.
  • The author bypasses most details of Kant’s moral theory, including how the universalization test works, how the formulations of the moral law are reconciled, what the fact of reason involves, and how to understand Kant’s theory of freedom.
  • The author also states that he does not attempt to explain the nature of the is–ought gap and remains neutral on semantic and teleological “ought”s, focusing on practical and epistemic “ought”s.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/oso/9780199688265.003.0016

Cites

27 of 27 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 of 71 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

Show all 55 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 31
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 66
  • The quote only partly states this claim. 2
87 of 87

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Kant's core views remained relatively stable through the decade during which the Critique of Pure Reason, Groundwork, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of the Power of Judgment were produced.

    “It is unlikely that Kant's views remained perfectly fixed through the decade during which these works were produced.I assume, however, that Kant's core views remained relatively stable.”

  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    It is unlikely that the notion of reason is both positively and negatively normative (as opposed to reason becoming so when other factors are added).

    “I am assuming that it is unlikely that the notion of reason is both positively and negatively normative (as opposed to reason becoming so when other factors are added).”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    As far as we know, Kant had limited access to Hume's Treatise and never carefully studied Book 3.

    “As far as we know, Kant had limited access to Hume's Treatise, and never carefully studied Book 3.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Hume did not have Kant's view in mind when he wrote the Treatise.

    “Hume did not have Kant's view in mind when he wrote the Treatise.”

  • The paper relies on this without support.

    G. E. Moore did have Kant in mind when he made his Open Question Argument.

    “G. E. Moore, however, did have Kant in mind when he made his Open Question Argument.”
5 of 5

Citations

Cites

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Show all 18 references

Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. 1990, Kant’s theory of freedom
  2. 2001, European Journal of Philosophy
  3. 1996, Creating the kingdom of ends
  4. 1966, Principia ethica
  5. 2009, Kantian ethics

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Marshall, C.
Affiliations
University of Washington (US)
Corresponding author
Marshall, Colin
ORCID
Marshall, Colin
Venue
The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds
Publisher
Oxford University PressOxford
Published
2022-07-14
Pages
382-404
DOI
10.1093/oso/9780199688265.003.0016
OpenAlex
W4293832773
Cited by
13
References
18
Citations by year
2023: 12
FWCI
36.93
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Locations
PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Kantian Philosophy and Modern Interpretations
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
Immanuel Kant, is-ought problem, moral ought, reason and will, freedom, moral judgment, G. E. Moore, David Hume, metaethics

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