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Do We Have Free Will?
Abstract
I have taken an experimental approach to this question. Freely voluntary acts are pre ceded by a specific electrical change in the brain (the ‘readiness potential’, RP) that begins 550 ms before the act. Human subjects became aware of intention to act 350–400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms. before the motor act. The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. But the conscious function could still control the outcome; it can veto the act. Free will is therefore not excluded. These findings put constraints on views of how free will may operate; it would not initiate a voluntary act but it could control performance of the act. The findings also affect views of guilt and responsibility. But the deeper question still remains: Are freely voluntary acts subject to macro deterministic laws or can they appear without such constraints, non-determined by natural laws and ‘truly free’? I shall present an experimentalist view about these fundamental philosophical opposites. The question of free will goes to the root of our views about human nature and how we relate to the universe and to natural laws. Are we completely defined by the deter
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Citations
Cited by
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2006) · Journal of Personality · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.2006.00420.x · Cited by 1,642
Body consciousness: a philosophy of mindfulness and somaesthetics
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-1409 · Cited by 433
Quantum Computing since Democritus
Aaronson, S. (2013) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511979309 · Cited by 352
Free Will in Scientific Psychology
Baumeister, R. F. (2008) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00057.x · Cited by 320
At the Potter’s Wheel : An Argument for Material Agency
Malafouris, L. (2008) · Material Agency · doi:10.1007/978-0-387-74711-8_2 · Cited by 279
Metadata
- Authors
- Libet, B.
- Venue
- The Oxford Handbook of Free Will
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2005-03-03
- Pages
- 550-564
- OpenAlex
- W311410274
- Cited by
- 299
- References
- 0
- Type
- reference entry
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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