The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Over the latter half of the last century English-speaking philosophy became increasingly committed to naturalistic doctrines. Much of this naturalistic turn can be attributed to the widespread acceptance of the thesis that the physical realm is causally closed. This article contains four sections. The first section offers an initial formulation of the thesis that physics is causally closed and explains its immediate implications. The second section then discusses the evidence for the thesis from a historical perspective. The third section considers ways of making the thesis properly precise. Finally, the fourth section explores the connections between the thesis and the more general issue of naturalism.
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Cites
Jackson, F. (1982) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2960077 · Cited by 2,477
Papineau, D. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0199243824.001.0001 · Cited by 884
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Metadata
- Authors
- Papineau, D.
- Venue
- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2009-09-02
- Pages
- 53-65
- OpenAlex
- W2732587148
- Cited by
- 166
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 4.98
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Papineau, D. (2009). The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199262618.003.0003
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.