The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach
Abstract
Despite the recent proliferation of interfirm alliances designed to govern cooperative efforts in creating or exploiting technology, we have limited understanding of how firms choose among the various alliance types available to them. In this article, I examine the governance properties of different alliance types and develop a simplified market-hierarchy continuum of alliances. This then forms the basis for an empirical examination of appropriability hazards and governance. Strong support for hypotheses derived from transaction cost theory is provided by analysis of a large sample of interfirm alliances. More hierarchical alliances are chosen when appropriability hazards are severe because technology is difficult to specify or because the scope of activities is wider, so that monitoring is hampered.
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Cites
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Cited by
Gulati, R. (1998) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/(sici)1097-0266(199804)19:4<293::aid-smj982>3.0.co;2-m · Cited by 4,668
Strategic alliances and interfirm knowledge transfer
Mowery, D. C., Oxley, J. E., & Silverman, B. S. (1996) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250171108 · Cited by 3,426
Self-citationGulati, R., & Singh, H. (1998) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393616 · Cited by 2,465
A Knowledge Accessing Theory of Strategic Alliances
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Gans, J. S., & Stern, S. (2003) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/s0048-7333(02)00103-8 · Cited by 1,294
Metadata
- Authors
- Oxley, J. E.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1997-10-01
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 387-409
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- 8756-6222
- OpenAlex
- W1965080745
- Cited by
- 1,089
- References
- 35
- FWCI
- 20.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.