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Cited by 1,089

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach

Oxley, J. E.·1997·Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Abstract

Despite the recent proliferation of interfirm alliances designed to govern cooperative efforts in creating or exploiting technology, we have limited understanding of how firms choose among the various alliance types available to them. In this article, I examine the governance properties of different alliance types and develop a simplified market-hierarchy continuum of alliances. This then forms the basis for an empirical examination of appropriability hazards and governance. Strong support for hypotheses derived from transaction cost theory is provided by analysis of a large sample of interfirm alliances. More hierarchical alliances are chosen when appropriability hazards are severe because technology is difficult to specify or because the scope of activities is wider, so that monitoring is hampered.

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Metadata

Authors
Oxley, J. E.
Venue
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
Published
1997-10-01
Volume
13
Issue
2
Pages
387-409
ISSN
  • 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
  • 8756-6222
OpenAlex
W1965080745
Cited by
1,089
References
35
FWCI
20.17
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023389
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Oxley, J. E. (1997). Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a023389

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.