The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards
Abstract
RICHARD CRASWELL, JOHN E. CALFEE; Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Volume 2, Issue 2, 1 October 1986,
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Citations
Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Posner, R. A. (1974) · Stanford Law Review · doi:10.2307/1227682 · Cited by 2,239
The Selection of Disputes for Litigation
Priest, G. L., & Klein, B. (1984) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467732 · Cited by 1,277
The Optimum Enforcement of Laws
Stigler, G. J. (1970) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259646 · Cited by 1,147
Strict Liability versus Negligence
Shavell, S. (1980) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467626 · Cited by 747
The optimal use of fines and imprisonment
Polinsky, A. M., & Shavell, S. (1984) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(84)90006-9 · Cited by 334
Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards
Calfee, J. E., & Craswell, R. (1984) · Virginia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1072946 · Cited by 160
Cited by
The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
Polinsky, A. M., & Shavell, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.38.1.45 · Cited by 1,159
Agoglia, C. P., Doupnik, T. S., & Tsakumis, G. T. (2011) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.00000045 · Cited by 339
Economic Theories of Legal Liability
Cooter, R. D. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.3.11 · Cited by 104
Metadata
- Venue
- The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1986
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1863540115
- Cited by
- 298
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 13.63
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.