Control, Bargains, and Cheating: The Politics of Public-Service Reform
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article aims to link together three themes in reform of public bureaucracy, focusing mainly on developed Westminster-type systems. The three themes are control in and over public bureaucracies, variety of types of public-service bargain between senior public officials and other actors in the political system, and strategic action or cheating over such bargains. The first part of the article identifies the idea of thermostatic control over the public service (by arms-length steering, transparent targets, and negative feedback mechanisms) as a key theme in contemporary doctrines of public-service reform. The second part sketches out some of the observable variety in public-service bargains across political systems, and argues that the thermostatic approach to control is more likely to develop in public services with agency bargains than in those with trustee bargains. The third part explores possibilities of cheating on the assumptions built into the thermostatic approach to control, arguing that the approach is far from cheat proof and can only be sustained in some conditions. The conclusion is that a PSB approach can help us to account for observed variety in contemporary public-service reform and for the surprisingly limited amount of full-blown managerialism that has developed in the era of new public management.
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Cites
The public as thermostat: dynamics of preferences for spending
Wlezien, C. (1995) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2111666 · Cited by 1,154
Niskanen, W. A. (1975) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466829 · Cited by 1,022
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Self-citationPrivatization and Its Reverse: Explaining the Dynamics of the Government Contracting Process
Hefetz, A. (2004) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muh012 · Cited by 544
The Politics of Public Service Bargains: Reward, Competency, Loyalty - and Blame
Hood, C., & Lodge, M. (2006) · doi:10.1093/019926967x.001.0001 · Cited by 479
Self-citationCraft, J., & Howlett, M. (2012) · Journal of Public Policy · doi:10.1017/s0143814x12000049 · Cited by 294
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Hill, C. J. (2004) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/mui011 · Cited by 282
Metadata
- Authors
- Hood, C.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2002-07-01
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 309-332
- ISSN
- 1053-1858 (ISSN-L)
- 1477-9803
- OpenAlex
- W1968252147
- Cited by
- 179
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 18.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Hood, C. (2002). Control, Bargains, and Cheating: The Politics of Public-Service Reform. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a003536
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.