Cited by 136Monetary Policy and Economic ImpactGlobal Financial Crisis and PoliciesBanking stability, regulation, efficiency

ON THE ASSESSMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 'INSTITUTIONAL' REMEDIES

FORDER, J.·1996·Oxford Economic Papers

Abstract

The most common approach to testing for the benefits of central-bank independence is argued to be methodologically flawed for the reason that the measure of independence does not permit a test the hypothesis which suggests that these benefits exist. Particular doubt is cast on the merits of proposals to legislate to create independence. The argument is elucidated by comparison with the testing of a hypothesis about the benefits of centralized and decentralized unions.

Integrity signals

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Crossref · 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028560

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1 of 1 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Authors
FORDER, J.
Affiliations
University of Oxford (GB)
Corresponding author
FORDER, J.
Venue
Oxford Economic Papers
Published
1996-01-01
Volume
48
Issue
1
Pages
39-51
ISSN
  • 0030-7653 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-3812
OpenAlex
W2142432893
Cited by
136
References
1
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 19 · 2019: 3 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 10
FWCI
13.70
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Oxford Economic Papers (publishedVersion)
  • Oxford University Research Archive (ORA) (University of Oxford) (acceptedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Global Financial Crisis and Policies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
Keywords
central bank independence, hypothesis testing, central bank legislation, monetary policy

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