The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
DECENTRALISATION AS AN INCENTIVE SCHEME
Abstract
DECENTRALISATION AS AN INCENTIVE SCHEME Get access PIERRE SALMON PIERRE SALMON Université de Bourgogne Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 3, Issue 2, SUMMER 1987, Pages 24–43, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/3.2.24 Published: 01 July 1987
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“Citizens can compare the performance of similar jurisdictions and reward or punish politicians in their jurisdiction (Salmon, 1987).”
From Regionalization and Consolidation of Municipal Taxes and Services (2018) · cites this paper as Salmon, 1987
Citations
Cites
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures
Tiebout, C. M. (1956) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/257839 · Cited by 13,222
A Theory of Yardstick Competition
Shleifer, A. (1985) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555560 · Cited by 1,413
A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts
Green, J. R., & Stokey, N. L. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261153 · Cited by 983
Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition
Stiglitz, J. E., & Nalebuff, B. (1983) · The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science · doi:10.7916/d87h1v6s · Cited by 975
Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes
O'Keeffe, M., Viscusi, W. K., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (1984) · Journal of Labor Economics · doi:10.1086/298022 · Cited by 391
Information, Competition, and Markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Nalebuff, B. (1983) · American Economic Review · doi:10.7916/d83b6946 · Cited by 356
The Bureaucracy of Murder Revisited
Breton, A., & Wintrobe, R. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261417 · Cited by 129
Fiscal Illusion and the Grantor Government
Logan, R. R. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261434 · Cited by 101
An Economic Theory of Political Parties
Galeotti, G., & Breton, A. (1986) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1986.tb01254.x · Cited by 39
The logic of pressure groups and the structure of the public sector
Salmon, P. M. (1987) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/s0176-2680(87)80005-8 · Cited by 34
Self-citation
Cited by
Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives
Weingast, B. R. (2009) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jue.2008.12.005 · Cited by 710
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE: LESSONS FROM AMERICA?
BOYNE, G. A. (1992) · Public Administration · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.1992.tb00942.x · Cited by 187
Regionalization and Consolidation of Municipal Taxes and Services
Hall, J. C., Matti, J., & Zhou, Y. (2018) · Review of Regional Studies · doi:10.52324/001c.8001 · Cited by 13
Metadata
- Authors
- SALMON, P.
- Affiliations
- Université de Bourgogne (FR)
- Corresponding author
- SALMON, PIERRE
- Venue
- Oxford Review of Economic Policy
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1987
- Volume
- 3
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 24-43
- ISSN
- 0266-903X (ISSN-L)
- 1460-2121
- OpenAlex
- W2029393516
- Cited by
- 515
- References
- 13
- Citations by year
- 2026: 12 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 27 · 2019: 26 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 19 · 2015: 19 · 2014: 21 · 2013: 26 · 2012: 29
- FWCI
- 7.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Oxford Review of Economic Policy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Local Government Finance and Decentralization
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Systems and Governance
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Policies and Impacts
- Keywords
- decentralization, incentive mechanisms, incentive compatibility, public choice theory, delegation, principal-agent problem, fiscal decentralization
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- The paper
- SALMON, P. (1987). DECENTRALISATION AS AN INCENTIVE SCHEME. Oxford Review of Economic Policy. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/3.2.24
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.