How should inmates be released from prison? An assessment of parole versus fixed-sentence regimes
Abstract
Over the past 30 years, many states have abolished parole boards, which traditionally have had the discretion to release inmates before the expiration of their full sentence, in favor of fixed-sentence regimes in which the original sentence is binding. However, if prison time lowers recidivism risk and if parole boards can accurately estimate inmates’ recidivism risk, then relative to a fixed-sentence regime, parole can provide allocative-efficiency benefits (costly prison space is allocated to the highest-risk offenders) and incentive benefits (prisoners know they must reduce their recidivism risk to gain an early release, so invest in their own rehabilitation). Exploiting quasi-experiments from the state of Georgia, I show that prison time reduces recidivism risk and that parole boards set prison time in an allocatively efficient manner. Prisoners respond to these incentives; after a reform that eliminated parole for certain offenders, they accumulated a greater number of disciplinary infractions, completed fewer prison rehabilitative programs, and recidivated at higher rates than inmates unaffected by the reform. I estimate that eliminating parole for all prisoners would increase the prison population by 10% while also increasing the crime rate through deleterious effects on recidivism.
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Kuziemko (2013) presents evidence that inmates respond to canceled parole eligibility by decreasing rehabilitation effort, including reducing program participation, thus increasing recidivism likelihood.
“Kuziemko (2013) exploits a 1998 policy reform which canceled parole eligibility for convicts in the state of Georgia. She presents evidence that inmates respond by decreasing their rehabilitation effort, including reducing their program participation while incarcerated, thus increasing recidivism likelihood.”
From Prison Rehabilitation Programs: Efficiency and Targeting (2021) · cites this paper as Kuziemko (2013)
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References 46 · Cited by 162
- Authors
- Kuziemko, I.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Corresponding author
- Kuziemko, Ilyana
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2012-11-27
- Volume
- 128
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 371-424
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2111403122
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 32 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 7 · 2015: 11 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 1
- FWCI
- 26.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Criminal Justice and Corrections Analysis
- Social Sciences › Law › Criminal Justice and Penology
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Keywords
- parole, parole board, recidivism, prisoner release, allocative efficiency, incentive effects, prisoner rehabilitation, prison population, crime rates, disciplinary violations
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