The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking *
Open accessAbstract
We find that regulators can implement identical rules inconsistently due to differences in their institutional design and incentives, and this behavior may adversely impact the effectiveness with which regulation is implemented. We study supervisory decisions of U.S. banking regulators and exploit a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal and state supervisors to the same bank at exogenously set time intervals. Comparing federal and state regulator supervisory ratings within the same bank, we find that federal regulators are systematically tougher, downgrading supervisory ratings almost twice as frequently as do state supervisors. State regulators counteract these downgrades to some degree by upgrading more frequently. Under federal regulators, banks report worse asset quality, higher regulatory capital ratios, and lower return on assets. Leniency of state regulators relative to their federal counterparts is related to costly outcomes, such as higher failure rates and lower repayment rates of government assistance funds. The discrepancy in regulator behavior is related to different weights given by regulators to local economic conditions and, to some extent, differences in regulatory resources. We find no support for regulator self-interest, which includes “revolving doors” as a reason for leniency of state regulators.
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Cites
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Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks
Buchak, G., Matvos, G., Piskorski, T., & Seru, A. (2018) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.03.011 · Cited by 1,784
Self-citationWhere the Risks Lie: A Survey on Systemic Risk
Benoit, S., Colliard, J.-E., Hurlin, C., & Pérignon, C. (2017) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfw026 · Cited by 684
Fintech and regtech: Impact on regulators and banks
Anagnostopoulos, I. (2018) · Journal of Economics and Business · doi:10.1016/j.jeconbus.2018.07.003 · Cited by 663
Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks
Buchak, G., Matvos, G., Piskorski, T., & Seru, A. (2017) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w23288 · Cited by 254
Self-citationHousehold Debt: Facts, Puzzles, Theories, and Policies
Zinman, J. (2015) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115640 · Cited by 165
Metadata
- Authors
- Agarwal, S., Lucca, D., Seru, A., & Trebbi, F.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2014-03-07
- Volume
- 129
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 889-938
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2143127107
- Cited by
- 479
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 60.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Agarwal, S., Lucca, D., Seru, A., & Trebbi, F. (2014). Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking *. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qju003
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.