Promotions and the Peter Principle*
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The best worker is not always the best candidate for manager. In these cases, do firms promote the best potential manager or the best worker in their current job? Using microdata on the performance of sales workers at 131 firms, we find evidence consistent with the Peter Principle, which proposes that firms prioritize current job performance in promotion decisions at the expense of other observable characteristics that better predict managerial performance. We estimate that the costs of promoting workers with lower managerial potential are high, suggesting either that firms are making inefficient promotion decisions or that the benefits of promotion-based incentives are great enough to justify the costs of managerial mismatch. We find that firms manage the costs of the Peter Principle by placing less weight on sales performance in promotion decisions when managerial roles entail greater responsibility and when frontline workers are incentivized by strong pay for performance.
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Cites
Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and nonrandomized studies
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Structural Equations, Treatment Effects, and Econometric Policy Evaluation1
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Wage Comparisons--A Selectivity Bias
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Cited by
Tett, R. P., Toich, M. J., & Ozkum, S. B. (2021) · Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-012420-062228 · Cited by 363
Li, D., Raymond, L., & Bergman, P. (2020) · doi:10.3386/w27736 · Cited by 64
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Metadata
- Authors
- Benson, A., Li, D., & Shue, K.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2019-08-16
- Volume
- 134
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 2085-2134
- ISSN
- 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
- 1531-4650
- OpenAlex
- W2762975052
- Cited by
- 160
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 15.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Benson, A., Li, D., & Shue, K. (2019). Promotions and the Peter Principle*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjz022
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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