The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pecuniary Externalities in Economies with Financial Frictions
Abstract
This article characterizes the efficiency properties of competitive economies with financial constraints, in which phenomena such as fire sales and financial amplification may arise. We show that financial constraints lead to two distinct types of pecuniary externalities: distributive externalities that arise from incomplete insurance markets and collateral externalities that arise from price-dependent financial constraints. For both types of externalities, we identify three sufficient statistics that determine optimal taxes on financing and investment decisions to implement constrained efficient allocations. We also show that fire sales and financial amplification are neither necessary nor sufficient to generate inefficient pecuniary externalities. We demonstrate how to employ our framework in a number of applications. Whereas collateral externalities generally lead to over-borrowing, the distortions from distributive externalities may easily flip sign, leading to either under- or over-borrowing. Both types of externalities may lead to under- or over-investment.
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Citations
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Cited by
Artificial Intelligence and Its Implications for Income Distribution and Unemployment
Korinek, A., & Stiglitz, J. (2017) · doi:10.3386/w24174 · Cited by 380
Self-citationAnatomy of Corporate Borrowing Constraints*
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Where Modern Macroeconomics Went Wrong
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Collective Moral Hazard and the Interbank Market
Altinoglu, L., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2023) · American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics · doi:10.1257/mac.20210333 · Cited by 16
Metadata
- Authors
- Dávila, E., & Korinek, A.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2017-02-10
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 352-395
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2585557295
- Cited by
- 332
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 44.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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