The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Informed and Uninformed Investment in Housing: The Downside of Diversification
Abstract
Mortgage lenders that concentrate in a few markets invest more in information collection than diversified lenders. Concentrated lenders focus on the information-intensive jumbo market and on high-risk borrowers. They are better positioned to price risks and, thus, ration credit less. Adverse selection, however, leads to higher retention of mortgages relative to diversified lenders. Finally, concentrated lenders have higher profits than diversified lenders, their profits vary less systematically, and their stock prices fell less during the 2007—2008 credit crisis. The results imply that geographic diversification led to a decline in screening by lenders, which likely played a role in the 2007–2008 crisis.
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Citations
Cites
On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Grossman, S. J. (1980) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8765r99 · Cited by 3,645
Berger, A. N., Miller, N. H., Petersen, M. A., Rajan, R. G., & Stein, J. C. (2005) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.003 · Cited by 1,888 · cited 1×
“…within the firm suggest that focused lenders – such as lenders concentrating on one or a small number of local markets – may have both better ability and stronger incentives to collect information that is costly to transmit to others (Stein, 2002; Berger et al, 2005; Liberti and Mian, forthcoming).”
BackgroundThe Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank Branch Deregulation
Jayaratne, J., & Strahan, P. E. (1996) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2946668 · Cited by 1,723
Self-citationFinancial Intermediary-Coalitions
Boyd, J. H., & Prescott, E. C. (1985) · doi:10.21034/sr.87 · Cited by 1,440
Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank Competition and Industry Structure in Local U.S. Markets
CETORELLI, N., & STRAHAN, P. E. (2006) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00841.x · Cited by 920
Self-citationDoes Credit Competition Affect Small‐Firm Finance?
RICE, T., & STRAHAN, P. E. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01555.x · Cited by 684 · cited 1×
“…transition to full interstate banking was completed with passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA), which effectively permitted bank holding companies to enter other states without permission and to operate branches across state lines (Rice and Strahan, 2010).”
BackgroundSelf-citationCredit Supply and the Price of Housing
Favara, G., & Imbs, J. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20121416 · Cited by 621
Cited by
Liquidity risk management and credit supply in the financial crisis
Cornett, M. M., McNutt, J. J., Strahan, P. E., & Tehranian, H. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.001 · Cited by 1,194
Self-citationLiberti, J. M., & Petersen, M. A. (2019) · The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · doi:10.1093/rcfs/cfy009 · Cited by 737
Originate-to-distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis
Purnanandam, A. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq106 · Cited by 527
The failure of models that predict failure: Distance, incentives, and defaults
Rajan, U., Seru, A., & Vig, V. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.09.012 · Cited by 497
The role of securitization in bank liquidity and funding management
Loutskina, E. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.005 · Cited by 416
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Loutskina, E., & Strahan, P. E.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-02-01
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1447-1480
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2153183704
- Cited by
- 220
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 44.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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