The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard: Evidence from Germany
Open accessAbstract
We use a structural econometric model to provide empirical evidence that safety nets in the banking industry lead to additional risk taking. To identify the moral hazard effect of bailout expectations on bank risk, we exploit the fact that regional political factors explain bank bailouts but not bank risk. The sample includes all observed capital preservation measures and distressed exits in the German banking industry during 1995–2006. A change of bailout expectations by two standard deviations increases the probability of official distress from 6.6% to 9.4%, which is economically significant.
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Cites
Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches
Petersen, M. A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn053 · Cited by 10,746
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261155 · Cited by 9,369
Spatial Econometrics: Methods and Models
Anselin, L. (1988) · Studies in Operational Regional Science · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7799-1 · Cited by 9,274
SOME PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING
Caliendo, M., & Kopeinig, S. (2008) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6419.2007.00527.x · Cited by 6,238
A Survey of Weak Instruments and Weak Identification in Generalized Method of Moments
Stock, J. H., Wright, J. H., & Yogo, M. (2002) · Journal of Business & Economic Statistics · doi:10.1198/073500102288618658 · Cited by 4,274
Bank governance, regulation and risk taking
Laeven, L. A., & Levine, R. E. (2008) · Cited by 3,269
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
Khwaja, A. I., & Mian, A. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355305775097524 · Cited by 2,366
Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G., & Levine, R. (2004) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2003.06.002 · Cited by 2,296
Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation
Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Detragiache, E. (2002) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3932(02)00171-x · Cited by 1,371
The effects of government ownership on bank lending
Sapienza, P. (2004) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2002.10.002 · Cited by 1,363
Cited by
Bank liquidity creation following regulatory interventions and capital support
Berger, A. N., Bouwman, C. H. S., Kick, T., & Schaeck, K. (2016) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2016.01.001 · Cited by 290
Carbon neutrality: The role of banks in optimal environmental management strategies
Chaudhry, S. M., Saeed, A., & Ahmed, R. (2021) · Journal of Environmental Management · doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2021.113545 · Cited by 33
Metadata
- Authors
- Dam, L., & Koetter, M.
- Venue
- Review of Financial Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2012-04-05
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 2343-2380
- ISSN
- 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-7368
- OpenAlex
- W2170013516
- Cited by
- 392
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 50.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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