The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Supervisory Effectiveness and Bank Risk
Open accessAbstract
This paper investigates the role of banking supervision in controlling bank risk. Banking supervision is measured in terms of enforcement outputs (i.e., on-site audits and sanctions). Our results show an inverted U-shaped relationship between on-site audits and bank risk, while the relationship between sanctions and risk appears to be linear and negative. We also consider the combined effect of effective supervision and banking regulation (in the form of capital and market discipline requirements) on bank risk. We find that effective supervision and market discipline requirements are important and complementary mechanisms in reducing bank fragility. This is in contrast to capital requirements, which prove to be rather futile in controlling bank risk, even when supplemented with a higher volume of on-site audits and sanctions.
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Cites
Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/s0304-4076(98)00009-8 · Cited by 22,571
Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1995) · Working Paper Series · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.1995.9517 · Cited by 14,755
Cited by
Bank liquidity creation following regulatory interventions and capital support
Berger, A. N., Bouwman, C. H. S., Kick, T., & Schaeck, K. (2016) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2016.01.001 · Cited by 290
Metadata
- Authors
- Delis, M. D., & Staikouras, P. K.
- Venue
- Review Of Finance
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2011-03-09
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 511-543
- ISSN
- 1382-6662 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-692X
- 1572-3097
- OpenAlex
- W2061191733
- Cited by
- 197
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 10.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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