The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy
Abstract
This article explores the nature of property rights systems, their evolution, and their effect on resource allocation. It is argued that certain institutional arrangements for land rights have evolved in order to reduce uncertainty and increase efficiency in credit as well as in land markets. Of particular relevance to developing countries, the article emphasizes the contribution of public sector infrastructure to effective land rights systems. An appendix to the article presents a formal model analyzing the effects of security of land rights on land prices, the intensity of cultivation, and the use of credit. Empirical evidence from Thailand supports several of the propositions derived from the model.
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Cites
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Self-citationThe Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West
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Self-citationThe Thai Rural Credit System: Public Subsidies, Private Information, and Segmented Markets
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Self-citationLand Policies and Farm Performance in Thailand's Forest Reserve Areas
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Self-citationSome Considerations Relating to Property Rights in Man
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Toward a Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective
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Cited by
Property rights and investment incentives: theory and evidence from Ghana
Besley, T. (1995) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262008 · Cited by 2,016
Collective Action, Property Rights, and Decentralization in Resource Use in India and Nepal
AGRAWAL, A., & OSTROM, E. (2001) · Politics & Society · doi:10.1177/0032329201029004002 · Cited by 943
Human Well-Being and the Natural Environment
Dasgupta, P. (2001) · doi:10.1093/0199247889.001.0001 · Cited by 794
CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS
Libecap, G. D. (2018) · Property Rights · doi:10.2307/j.ctv301f7w.14 · Cited by 766
Land tenure security and investment incentives: puzzling evidence from Burkina Faso
Brasselle, A.-S., Gaspart, F., & Platteau, J.-P. (2002) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(01)00190-0 · Cited by 673
Metadata
- Authors
- Feder, G., & Feeny, D.
- Venue
- The World Bank Economic Review
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1991
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 135-153
- ISSN
- 0258-6770 (ISSN-L)
- 1564-698X
- OpenAlex
- W1973934748
- Cited by
- 734
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 4.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.