The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
HOW DO MARKET FAILURES JUSTIFY INTERVENTIONS IN RURAL CREDIT MARKETS?
Abstract
Understanding of the economic causes and consequences of market failure in credit markets has progressed a great deal in recent years. This article draws on these developments to appraise the case for government intervention in rural financial markets in developing countries and to discover whether the theoretical findings can be used to identify directives for policy. Before debating the when and how of intervention, the article defines market failure, emphasizing the need to consider the full array of constraints that combine to make a market work imperfectly. The various reasons for market failure are discussed and set in the context in which credit markets function in developing countries. The article then looks at recurrent problems that may be cited as failures of the market justifying intervention. Among these problems are enforcement; imperfect information, especially adverse selection and moral hazard; the risk of bank runs; and the need for safeguards against the monopoly power of some lenders. The review concludes with a discussion of interventions, focusing on the learning process that must take place for financial markets to operate effectively.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261155 · Cited by 9,369
Money and Capital in Economic Development.
Luders, R., & McKinnon, R. (1974) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2978253 · Cited by 3,711
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements
Calomiris, C. W., & Kahn, C. M. (1991) · American Economic Review · doi:10.7916/d8th8x53 · Cited by 1,470
Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing
Jaffee, D. M., & Russell, T. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885327 · Cited by 1,411
Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets
Greenwald, B. C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1891114 · Cited by 1,353
Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets
Stiglitz, J. E. (1990) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/4.3.351 · Cited by 1,309
Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral
Besley, T., & Coate, S. (1995) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3878(94)00045-e · Cited by 1,227
Self-citationFinancial Fragility and Economic Performance
Bernanke, B., & Gertler, M. (1990) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2937820 · Cited by 926
Cited by
Morduch, J. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.4.1569 · Cited by 2,360
Do the Poor Insure? A Synthesis of the Literature on Risk and Consumption in Developing Countries
Alderman, H., & Paxson, C. H. (1994) · Economics in a Changing World · doi:10.1007/978-1-349-23458-5_3 · Cited by 502
Lending terms, financial literacy and formal credit accessibility
Korutaro Nkundabanyanga, S., Kasozi, D., Nalukenge, I., & Tauringana, V. (2014) · International Journal of Social Economics · doi:10.1108/ijse-03-2013-0075 · Cited by 149
Metadata
- Authors
- Besley, T.
- Venue
- The World Bank Research Observer
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1994
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 27-47
- ISSN
- 0257-3032 (ISSN-L)
- 1564-6971
- OpenAlex
- W2116256262
- Cited by
- 342
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 17.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: HOW DO MARKET FAILURES JUSTIFY INTERVENTIONS IN RURAL CREDIT MARKETS? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/wbro/9.1.27
- The paper
- Besley, T. (1994). HOW DO MARKET FAILURES JUSTIFY INTERVENTIONS IN RURAL CREDIT MARKETS? The World Bank Research Observer. https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/9.1.27
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.