The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Phenomenological Stability of Depersonalization: Comparing the Old with the New
Abstract
The view that depersonalization is a stable syndrome became well established during the first half of the 20th century. Current operational definitions restrict depersonalization to the experience of unreality. This is likely to neglect clinical features of potential neurobiological relevance. By using the year 1946 as the dividing line, 200 cases of depersonalization disorder reported in the medical literature since 1898 were divided into two historical groups (1 and 2). The groups were then compared in terms of 18 phenomenological variables with a sample of 45 prospective cases of DSM-IV depersonalization disorder (group 3 or gold standard). Groups 1 and 2 differed in terms of their symptom profile, but the highest frequency that symptoms achieved in either group did not differ from the rates identified in group 3. A core of (invariable) symptoms, including emotional numbing, visual derealization, and altered body experience, was present throughout. These high rates of spontaneous reporting in all three groups may be explained by the fact that they all are accompanied by specific distress. With the exception of heightened self-observation and altered time experiencing, all other symptoms were significantly lower in group 2. The results suggest that the phenomenology of depersonalization has remained stable over the last 100 years. Our study found differences in frequency for some symptoms, but these are likely to have resulted from reporting biases, themselves governed by changing theoretical views. Clinical descriptions became poorer as the present is approached. This cannot be solely explained on the basis of empirical progress, and it is likely that theoretical biases also play a role. Because the neurobiological relevance of the symptoms of depersonalization remains unknown, it makes sense to continue collecting as many symptoms as possible, thereby avoiding both biased selection or premature closure.
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“In terms of participant factors, the frequency of reported categories is likely a function of salience and effability, which is also a function of distress and available interpretive frameworks [175].”
From The varieties of contemplative experience: A mixed-methods study of meditation-related challenges in Western Buddhists (2017) · cites this paper as [175]
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Cites
The Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale: a new instrument for the measurement of depersonalisation
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Self-citationDepersonalization: neurobiological perspectives.
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“, vision or audition), and in this sense they can be modality-specific (Sierra and Berrios, 1998).”
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Cited by
Lindahl, J. R., Fisher, N. E., Cooper, D. J., Rosen, R. K., & Britton, W. B. (2017) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0176239 · Cited by 476
Depersonalization: a selective impairment of self-awareness
Sierra, M., & David, A. S. (2011) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.10.018 · Cited by 254
Self-citationDifferent types of ‘dissociation’ have different psychological mechanisms
Brown, R. J. (2006) · Journal of Trauma & Dissociation · doi:10.1300/j229v07n04_02 · Cited by 217
“…a dream,” a sense of being an outside observer of one’s body, and perceptions of the external world as flat, lifeless and “strange” (Noyes & Kletti, 1977; Steinberg, 1994; Butler, Duran, Jasiukaitis, Koopman & Spiegel, 1996; Allen, Console & Lewis, 1999; Sierra & Berrios, 2001; Baker et al., 2003).”
Depersonalisation Disorder: A Contemporary Overview
Simeon, D. (2004) · CNS Drugs · doi:10.2165/00023210-200418060-00002 · Cited by 198
Amputees By Choice: Body Integrity Identity Disorder and the Ethics of Amputation
BAYNE, T., & LEVY, N. (2005) · Journal of Applied Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.2005.00293.x · Cited by 184
Metadata
- Authors
- SIERRA, M., & BERRIOS, G. E.
- Affiliations
- King's College London (GB)
- Venue
- The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease
- Published
- 2001-09
- Volume
- 189
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 629-636
- ISSN
- 0022-3018 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2320255118
- Cited by
- 100
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 17 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 3 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 1.29
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Psychosomatic Disorders and Their Treatments
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Anxiety, Depression, Psychometrics, Treatment, Cognitive Processes
- Keywords
- depersonalization disorder, depersonalization, phenomenology, symptom stability, history of psychiatry, DSM-IV, emotional numbing, self-observation, reporting bias, unreality
- MeSH terms
- Adult, Depersonalization, Female, Humans, Male, Terminology as Topic, Prospective Studies, Psychiatric Status Rating Scales, Psychiatry, Cohort Studies, History, 20th Century
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- SIERRA, M., & BERRIOS, G. E. (2001). The Phenomenological Stability of Depersonalization: Comparing the Old with the New. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. https://doi.org/10.1097/00005053-200109000-00010
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.