Commentary: On NRI, IDI, and “Good-Looking” Statistics with Nothing Underneath
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Abstract
Articles by Pencina et al from 2008 onward have introduced the Net Reclassification Indices (NRI, notably NRI>0) and its cousin, the Integrated Discrimination Increment (IDI), along with several variants. As reviewed recently by Kerr et al,1 this family of statistics has major shortcomings. These formulations have nonetheless gained immense popularity, as well as authoritative support (Hlatky et al2). I believe I offend no one by a frank appraisal. The summary by Kerr et al1 illustrates the dangers of inventing and popularizing new statistical measures that are based entirely on “nice looks” without appropriate theoretical underpinning. The NRI/IDI statistics address the incremental prognostic impact of a new binary risk “oracle” that adds a new marker to an existing one. (“Oracle” in this context is a term covering any kind of black-box prediction rule.) NRI and IDI are designed to assess the risk refinement (enhanced risk differentiation) provided by the new marker. Intuitively, this risk refinement is what the measures reflect—but what do these measures measure? An epidemiological measure should estimate an easily understood, operationally relevant, design-independent (and preferably also model-independent) population characteristic. NRI and IDI fail already here. Kerr et al1 have emphasized that, in policy selection contexts such as this, the evaluation should rest on utility benefit gained (or cost saved); again, as Kerr notes, NRI and IDI do not have this form. The measures do, however, look nice and convincing to medical investigators. Statisticians themselves are not immune to the allure of good looks. New tools are sometimes introduced on grounds of mathematical elegance and slick fit to model anatomy. Consider the universal acceptance of hazard ratios in the field of survival analyses: is that primarily a product of medical concerns about adding years to human life—or is it dictated by the right-censored nature of human experience? The latter, obviously. A tool has taken precedence over the goal. The kappa (κ) coefficient of agreement is another example. An elegant construct, but what does it mean? People report it with confidence limits, but nobody knows what to make of them; the (1 – α) 100% warranty is void and waste. Considering that the goal of classification is optimal assignment of cases to classes (eg, treatment groups), a cogent operational measure of non-agreement would be the clinical benefit obtainable with the use of two assessors instead of one: the closer their agreement, the less the second opinion adds. Try this—and peer reviewers will cry for κ. Once there is agreement that a proposed statistic estimates a quantity of genuine interest, one may tick off the “confidence limits potentially meaningful?” box and proceed to the question of bias. When the statistic flows from a nonlinear model, difficulties arise. Ongoing Monte Carlo studies by the Seattle group (cf, Kerr et al1) and by ours (Thomas Gerds) suggest that the NRI behaves poorly in logistic models. Noninformative predictors (useless biomarkers) often come out with positive scores.3 The next premarketing requirement for a new statistic is a description of its general statistical behavior, standard error, and efficiency. Kerr et al4 deserve credit for discovering that the naive standard error formula for IDI is misleading because it ignores the interpatient dependence that arises when model parameters and IDI are estimated from the same data. Importantly, they also observed that IDI tends to have a surprisingly non-Gaussian sampling distribution—a feature that leaves any standard error formula lame. Who would suspect? Unknown to many scientists, evaluation of risk is beset with an additional problem that can be avoided only by insisting on a particular class of evaluation tools. The problem is this: We want the best candidate to win. We do not want an athlete to be able to improve his position by shooting himself in the foot. Under no circumstances should a risk assessor, by some clever systematic distortion of the risk assessments, be able to improve his apparent performance. The evaluation tools that ensure this are called proper scoring rules. Their key property is this: when a patient’s true risk is π, then quoting any risk figure, p, different from π will reduce the expected score; and the greater the discrepancy, the greater the reduction in expected score. He who honestly believes that π = 0.265 will expect to be penalized for quoting any other p. There is no way he can beat the truth—or hope to beat his own conviction. Nonproper scoring rules, by contrast, may fool or be fooled by their users: they may react inappropriately to miscalibrated risks—and are vulnerable to strategically distorted risk input. NRI and IDI are seriously nonproper, in that they reward overconfidence. In fact, they make it profitable to force toward 1 those risks that are already above average and to force below-average risks toward 0. Using th
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Moons, K. G. M., Altman, D. G., Reitsma, J. B., Ioannidis, J. P. A., Macaskill, P., Steyerberg, E. W., Vickers, A. J., Ransohoff, D. F., & Collins, G. S. (2015) · Annals of Internal Medicine · doi:10.7326/m14-0698 · Cited by 5,147
Pepe, M. S., Fan, J., Feng, Z., Gerds, T., & Hilden, J. (2015) · Statistics in Biosciences · doi:10.1007/s12561-014-9118-0 · Cited by 191
“M. S. Pepe (B) · J. Fan Biostatistics and Biomathematics Program, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, 1100 Fairview Ave N, M2B500, Seattle, WA 98109, USA e-mail: mspepe@u.washington.edu Z. Feng The University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center, 1515 Holcombe Blvd., Houston, TX 77030, USA T. Gerds · J. Hilden Depar…”
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Buczinski, S., Faure, C., Jolivet, S., & Abdallah, A. (2016) · New Zealand Veterinary Journal · doi:10.1080/00480169.2016.1153439 · Cited by 39
Buczinski, S., Boccardo, A., & Pravettoni, D. (2021) · Animals · doi:10.3390/ani11113244 · Cited by 15
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Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Hilden, J.
- Venue
- Epidemiology
- Published
- 2014-03
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 265-267
- ISSN
- 1044-3983 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1981045328
- Cited by
- 33
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 6.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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