Cited by 288Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: image scoring or standing strategy?

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Milinski, Manfred, Semmann, Dirk, Bakker, Theo C. M., Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen·2001·Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences

Abstract

Theorists have only recently shown that cooperation through indirect reciprocity can evolve. The first modelling approach favoured a mechanism called image scoring. Helping someone increases one's image score, whereas refusing to help reduces it. The evolutionary outcome was a discriminator image scoring strategy that helps everybody who has, for example, a positive image score. Two experimental studies with humans found results that were compatible with discriminator image scoring. However, a new analysis of other theorists, based on another population structure, has cast doubts on the evolutionary stability of strategies using the recipient's score as a sole basis for decision. The new theoretical study confirmed that a strategy aiming at "good standing" has superior properties and easily beats image scoring. An individual loses good standing by failing to help a recipient in good standing, whereas failing to help recipients who lack good standing does not damage the standing of a potential donor (but would reduce his image score). The present empirical study with 23 groups of seven human subjects each was designed for distinguishing between the two proposed mechanisms experimentally. The results differed strongly from standing strategies, which might demand too much working memory capacity, but were compatible with image scoring or a similar strategy to a large extent. Furthermore, donors of constant "NO players" compensated for their refusing to help these players by bein…

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Crossref · 10.1098/rspb.2001.1809

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  • There is evidence for 'upstream' indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks: short loops and a high benefit-to-cost ratio favour cooperation.

    “There is evidence for 'upstream' indirect reciprocity in cyclical networks: as expected, short loops and a high benefit-to-cost ratio favour cooperation 65 .”

    From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [65]

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References 20 · Cited by 288

Authors
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., Bakker, T. C. M., & Krambeck, H.-J.
Affiliations
  • Max Planck Society (DE)
  • University of Bonn (DE)
Venue
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences
Published
2001-12-07
Volume
268
Issue
1484
Pages
2495-2501
ISSN
  • 0080-4649 (ISSN-L)
  • 0962-8452
  • 1471-2954
OpenAlex
W2092662736
Cited by
288
References
20
Citations by year
2026: 3 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 16 · 2014: 22 · 2013: 14 · 2012: 14
FWCI
24.80
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
indirect reciprocity, cooperation, image scoring, evolutionary stability, population structure, working memory, human cooperation, experimental evolution
MeSH terms
Cooperative Behavior, Humans, Prejudice

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