Beyond existence and aiming outside the laboratory: estimating frequency-dependent and pay-off-biased social learning strategies
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The existence of social learning has been confirmed in diverse taxa, from apes to guppies. In order to advance our understanding of the consequences of social transmission and evolution of behaviour, however, we require statistical tools that can distinguish among diverse social learning strategies. In this paper, we advance two main ideas. First, social learning is diverse, in the sense that individuals can take advantage of different kinds of information and combine them in different ways. Examining learning strategies for different information conditions illuminates the more detailed design of social learning. We construct and analyse an evolutionary model of diverse social learning heuristics, in order to generate predictions and illustrate the impact of design differences on an organism's fitness. Second, in order to eventually escape the laboratory and apply social learning models to natural behaviour, we require statistical methods that do not depend upon tight experimental control. Therefore, we examine strategic social learning in an experimental setting in which the social information itself is endogenous to the experimental group, as it is in natural settings. We develop statistical models for distinguishing among different strategic uses of social information. The experimental data strongly suggest that most participants employ a hierarchical strategy that uses both average observed pay-offs of options as well as frequency information, the same model predicted by our evolutionary analysis to dominate a wide range of conditions.
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There is much evidence that individuals who excel tend to be imitated excessively, which creates a selective force toward cultural strategies that yield higher payoffs.
“There is much evidence that individuals who excel tend to be imitated excessively ([14]), which creates a selective force toward cultural strategies that yield higher payoffs [1, 20].”
From The Role of Social Learning and Collective Norm Formation in Fostering Cooperation in LLM Multi-Agent Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [20]
Payoff-biased learning is a common learning strategy among humans.
“Payoff-biased learning is a common learning strategy among humans.”
From The Role of Social Learning and Collective Norm Formation in Fostering Cooperation in LLM Multi-Agent Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [20]
When individuals have information about the payoffs of others, it is possible to use these cues to adaptively bias social learning, leading to evolutionary dynamics that can be very similar to natural selection.
“When individuals have information about the payoffs of others, it is possible to use these cues to adaptively bias social learning, leading to evolutionary dynamics that can be very similar to natural selection [20].”
From The Role of Social Learning and Collective Norm Formation in Fostering Cooperation in LLM Multi-Agent Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [20]
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References 54 · Cited by 283
- Authors
- McElreath, R., Bell, A. V., Efferson, C., Lubell, M., Richerson, P. J., & Waring, T.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Davis (US)
- Institute for Empirical research in EconomicsBlümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 zürich, Switzerland
- Corresponding author
- McElreath, Richard
- Venue
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2008-09-17
- Volume
- 363
- Issue
- 1509
- Pages
- 3515-3528
- ISSN
- 0962-8436 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-2970
- PMC
- PMC2607339
- OpenAlex
- W2165657585
- Cited by
- 283
- References
- 54
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 29 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 38
- FWCI
- 203.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
- IRIS (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- SERVAL (Université de Lausanne) (submittedVersion)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Keywords
- social learning, social learning strategies, evolution of behavior, social transmission
- MeSH terms
- Adult, California, Biological Evolution, Games, Experimental, Humans, Learning, Models, Theoretical, Social Behavior, Information Dissemination
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