Cited by 283Language and cultural evolutionEvolutionary Game Theory and CooperationChild and Animal Learning Development

Beyond existence and aiming outside the laboratory: estimating frequency-dependent and pay-off-biased social learning strategies

Open access
McElreath, Richard, Bell, Adrian V, Efferson, Charles, Lubell, Mark, Richerson, Peter J, Waring, Timothy·2008·Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences

Abstract

The existence of social learning has been confirmed in diverse taxa, from apes to guppies. In order to advance our understanding of the consequences of social transmission and evolution of behaviour, however, we require statistical tools that can distinguish among diverse social learning strategies. In this paper, we advance two main ideas. First, social learning is diverse, in the sense that individuals can take advantage of different kinds of information and combine them in different ways. Examining learning strategies for different information conditions illuminates the more detailed design of social learning. We construct and analyse an evolutionary model of diverse social learning heuristics, in order to generate predictions and illustrate the impact of design differences on an organism's fitness. Second, in order to eventually escape the laboratory and apply social learning models to natural behaviour, we require statistical methods that do not depend upon tight experimental control. Therefore, we examine strategic social learning in an experimental setting in which the social information itself is endogenous to the experimental group, as it is in natural settings. We develop statistical models for distinguishing among different strategic uses of social information. The experimental data strongly suggest that most participants employ a hierarchical strategy that uses both average observed pay-offs of options as well as frequency information, the same model predicted by our evolutionary analysis to dominate a wide range of conditions.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1098/rstb.2008.0131

Cites

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

We couldn’t retrieve this paper’s full text, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet

References 54 · Cited by 283

Authors
McElreath, R., Bell, A. V., Efferson, C., Lubell, M., Richerson, P. J., & Waring, T.
Affiliations
  • University of California, Davis (US)
  • Institute for Empirical research in EconomicsBlümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 zürich, Switzerland
Corresponding author
McElreath, Richard
Venue
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Published
2008-09-17
Volume
363
Issue
1509
Pages
3515-3528
ISSN
  • 0962-8436 (ISSN-L)
  • 1471-2970
OpenAlex
W2165657585
Cited by
283
References
54
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 19 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 29 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 15 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 38
FWCI
203.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
  • IRIS (submittedVersion)
  • MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
  • SERVAL (Université de Lausanne) (submittedVersion)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Zurich Open Repository and Archive (University of Zurich)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Cultural Studies › Language and cultural evolution
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
Keywords
social learning, social learning strategies, evolution of behavior, social transmission
MeSH terms
Adult, California, Biological Evolution, Games, Experimental, Humans, Learning, Models, Theoretical, Social Behavior, Information Dissemination

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review