A computational framework for the study of confidence in humans and animals
Open accessAbstract
Confidence judgements, self-assessments about the quality of a subject's knowledge, are considered a central example of metacognition. Prima facie, introspection and self-report appear the only way to access the subjective sense of confidence or uncertainty. Contrary to this notion, overt behavioural measures can be used to study confidence judgements by animals trained in decision-making tasks with perceptual or mnemonic uncertainty. Here, we suggest that a computational approach can clarify the issues involved in interpreting these tasks and provide a much needed springboard for advancing the scientific understanding of confidence. We first review relevant theories of probabilistic inference and decision-making. We then critically discuss behavioural tasks employed to measure confidence in animals and show how quantitative models can help to constrain the computational strategies underlying confidence-reporting behaviours. In our view, post-decision wagering tasks with continuous measures of confidence appear to offer the best available metrics of confidence. Since behavioural reports alone provide a limited window into mechanism, we argue that progress calls for measuring the neural representations and identifying the computations underlying confidence reports. We present a case study using such a computational approach to study the neural correlates of decision confidence in rats. This work shows that confidence assessments may be considered higher order, but can be generated using elementary neural computations that are available to a wide range of species. Finally, we discuss the relationship of confidence judgements to the wider behavioural uses of confidence and uncertainty.
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Probability judgments can be compared against quantities derived from probabilistic models of confidence.
“Moreover, probability judgments can be compared against quantities derived from probabilistic models of confidence (e.g., Kepecs and Mainen, 2012).”
From How to measure metacognition (2014) · cites this paper as Kepecs and Mainen, 2012
Dissociating confidence from other features of the decision process requires acquisition of separate measures of choice and confidence.
“Critically, dissociating confidence from other features of the decision process requires acquisition of separate measures of choice and confidence11.”
From Confidence in value-based choice (2013) · cites this paper as [11]
A computational definition of confidence can formalize intuition, and potentially unify several semantic concepts within a common framework.
“Further, a computational definition of confidence can formalize intuition, and potentially unify several semantic concepts within a common framework [ 7 ].”
From Metacognition: computation, biology and function (2012) · cites this paper as [7]
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References 154 · Cited by 305
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Metcalfe, J. & Shimamura, A. P. (eds) 1994 Metacogni- tion: knowing about knowing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Sutton, R. S. & Barto, A. G. 1998 Reinforcement learn- ing: an introduction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Teller, S. A. 1989 Metamemory in the pigeon: predic- tion of performance on a delayed matching to sample task. Thesis, Reed College, Portland, OR.
- Sanders, J. & Kepecs, A. 2010 How certain are you? Explicit and implicit measures of decision confidence. In Proc. 6th Annu. Conf. on Neuroeconomics, Evanston, IL. 110
- Stephens, D. W. & Krebs, J. R. 1986 Foraging theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 118
- Authors
- Kepecs, A., & Mainen, Z. F.
- Affiliations
- Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, 1 Bungtown Road, Cold Spring Harbor, NY 11724, USA
- Centro Champalimaud (PT)
- ORCID
- Mainen, Zachary F.
- Venue
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2012-05-19
- Volume
- 367
- Issue
- 1594
- Pages
- 1322-1337
- ISSN
- 0962-8436 (ISSN-L)
- 1471-2970
- PMC
- PMC3318772
- OpenAlex
- W2107411295
- Cited by
- 305
- References
- 154
- Citations by year
- 2026: 16 · 2025: 34 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 22 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 21 · 2017: 23 · 2016: 27 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 17 · 2013: 6 · 2012: 7
- FWCI
- 1.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Institutional Repository (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) (acceptedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory and Neural Mechanisms
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- metacognition, decision confidence, perceptual uncertainty, probabilistic inference, decision-making, rats, animal cognition, uncertainty
- MeSH terms
- Animals, Behavior, Decision Making, Humans, Self-Assessment, Confidence Intervals
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