Coherent-pulse implementations of quantum cryptography protocols resistant to photon-number-splitting attacks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We propose a class of quantum cryptography protocols that are robust against photon-number-splitting attacks (PNS) in a weak coherent-pulse implementation. We give a quite exhaustive analysis of several eavesdropping attacks on these schemes. The honest parties (Alice and Bob) use present-day technology, in particular an attenuated laser as an approximation of a single-photon source. The idea of the protocols is to exploit the nonorthogonality of quantum states to decrease the information accessible to Eve due to the multiphoton pulses produced by the imperfect source. The distance at which the key distribution becomes insecure due to the PNS attack is significantly increased compared to the existing schemes. We also show that strong-pulse implementations, where a strong pulse is included as a reference, allow for key distribution robust against photon-number-splitting attacks.
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Cites
Gisin, N., Ribordy, G., Tittel, W., & Zbinden, H. (2002) · Reviews of Modern Physics · doi:10.1103/revmodphys.74.145 · Cited by 8,515
Self-citationA single quantum cannot be cloned
Wootters, W. K., & Zurek, W. H. (1982) · Nature · doi:10.1038/299802a0 · Cited by 5,406
Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
Shor, P. W., & Preskill, J. (2000) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.85.441 · Cited by 3,047
Quantum Theory: Concepts and Methods
Peres, A., & Ballentine, L. E. (1995) · American Journal of Physics · doi:10.1119/1.17946 · Cited by 2,561
Optimal Quantum Cloning Machines
Gisin, N., & Massar, S. (1997) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.79.2153 · Cited by 722
Self-citationOptical coherence: A convenient fiction
Mølmer, K. (1997) · Physical Review A · doi:10.1103/physreva.55.3195 · Cited by 223
Cited by
The security of practical quantum key distribution
Scarani, V., Bechmann-Pasquinucci, H., Cerf, N. J., Dušek, M., Lütkenhaus, N., & Peev, M. (2009) · Reviews of Modern Physics · doi:10.1103/revmodphys.81.1301 · Cited by 3,726
Self-citationBeating the Photon-Number-Splitting Attack in Practical Quantum Cryptography
Wang, X.-B. (2005) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.94.230503 · Cited by 1,500
Scarani, V., Iblisdir, S., Gisin, N., & Acín, A. (2005) · Reviews of Modern Physics · doi:10.1103/revmodphys.77.1225 · Cited by 612
Self-citationEffects of detector efficiency mismatch on security of quantum cryptosystems
Makarov, V., Anisimov, A., & Skaar, J. (2006) · Physical Review A · doi:10.1103/physreva.74.022313 · Cited by 395
The impact of quantum computing on present cryptography
Mavroeidis, V., Vishi, K., D., M., & Jøsang, A. (2018) · International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications · doi:10.14569/ijacsa.2018.090354 · Cited by 361
“• SARG04 [33, 34] - is similar to BB84 but instead of using the state to code the bits, the bases are used.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Acín, A., Gisin, N., & Scarani, V.
- Venue
- Physical Review A
- Publisher
- American Physical Society (APS)
- Published
- 2004-01-15
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 1
- ISSN
- 0556-2791 (ISSN-L)
- 1050-2947
- 1094-1622
- OpenAlex
- W2075497199
- Cited by
- 136
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 11.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Acín, A., Gisin, N., & Scarani, V. (2004). Coherent-pulse implementations of quantum cryptography protocols resistant to photon-number-splitting attacks. Physical Review A. https://doi.org/10.1103/physreva.69.012309
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