Security of Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution via a Gaussian de Finetti Reduction

Abstract

Establishing the security of continuous-variable quantum key distribution against general attacks in a realistic finite-size regime is an outstanding open problem in the field of theoretical quantum cryptography if we restrict our attention to protocols that rely on the exchange of coherent states. Indeed, techniques based on the uncertainty principle are not known to work for such protocols, and the usual tools based on de Finetti reductions only provide security for unrealistically large block lengths. We address this problem here by considering a new type of Gaussian de Finetti reduction, that exploits the invariance of some continuous-variable protocols under the action of the unitary group U(n) (instead of the symmetric group S_{n} as in usual de Finetti theorems), and by introducing generalized SU(2,2) coherent states. Crucially, combined with an energy test, this allows us to truncate the Hilbert space globally instead as at the single-mode level as in previous approaches that failed to provide security in realistic conditions. Our reduction shows that it is sufficient to prove the security of these protocols against Gaussian collective attacks in order to obtain security against general attacks, thereby confirming rigorously the widely held belief that Gaussian attacks are indeed optimal against such protocols.