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Strategic gaming analysis for electric power systems: an MPEC approach
Abstract
Transmission constraints and market concentration may prevent power markets from being fully competitive, allowing firms to exercise market power and raise prices above marginal cost. We present a strategic gaming model for analyzing such markets; it represents an oligopolistic market economy consisting of several dominant firms in an electric power network. Each generating firm submits bids to an ISO, choosing its bids to maximize profits subject to anticipated reactions by rival firms. The single-firm model is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) with a parameter-dependent spatial price equilibrium problem as the inner problem. Power flows and pricing strategies are constrained by the ISO's linearized DC optimal power flow (OFF) model. A penalty interior point algorithm is used to compute a local optimal solution of the MPEC. Numerical examples based on a 30 bus network are presented, including multi-firm Nash equilibria in which each player solves an MPEC of the single-firm type.
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Cited by
Electricity price forecasting: A review of the state-of-the-art with a look into the future
Weron, R. (2014) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2014.08.008 · Cited by 1,646
Linear complementarity models of Nash-Cournot competition in bilateral and POOLCO power markets
Hobbs, B. E. (2001) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/59.918286 · Cited by 522
Self-citationEvaluation of peer-to-peer energy sharing mechanisms based on a multiagent simulation framework
Zhou, Y., Wu, J., & Long, C. (2018) · Applied Energy · doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.02.089 · Cited by 448
A Reinforcement Learning Model to Assess Market Power Under Auction-Based Energy Pricing
Nanduri, V., & Das, T. K. (2007) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2006.888977 · Cited by 168
A Stochastic Game Approach for Modeling Wholesale Energy Bidding in Deregulated Power Markets
Ragupathi, R., & Das, T. K. (2004) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2004.825910 · Cited by 31
Metadata
- Authors
- Hobbs, B. F., Metzler, C. B., & Pang, J.-S.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
- Published
- 2000-05
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 638-645
- ISSN
- 0885-8950 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2166063259
- Cited by
- 821
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 16.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Hobbs, B. F., Metzler, C. B., & Pang, J.-S. (2000). Strategic gaming analysis for electric power systems: an MPEC approach. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. https://doi.org/10.1109/59.867153
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