PREVIR: Fortifying Vehicular Networks Against Denial of Service Attacks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 49 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Vehicular networks are expanding their applications for future sustainability. The reported increasing rate of data breaches through vehicular networks by Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) type of intrusion creates concern for such networks. Existing security solutions focus only on intrusion detection. However, prevention solutions are more proactive and provide security by probabilistic analysis. Existing prevention models for vehicular networks have low accuracy and are unable to handle zero-day attacks and advanced persistent threats. In this paper, we solve the problems mentioned above and introducePredictive Risk Evaluation for Vehicular Infrastructure Resilience (PREVIR), the first amalgamated model of logit method (statistical analysis) and LogitBoost method (machine learning) to prevent DDoS attacks in vehicular networks. In PREVIR, the logit model predicts the packet probabilities for identifying maliciousness. The machine learning method improves PREVIR’s performance through iterative refinement of the model’s periodic updates based on new traffic parameters. We run a set of experiments on PREVIR. We use our NS3-generated dataset, NSL-KDD public dataset, and CIC-DDoS public dataset. PREVIR analyses multiple attack types, including UDP flood, TCP flood, mixed flooding, U2R, Probe, and R2L attacks. The results show that PREVIR classifies packets with accuracy up to 99.99%. Our proposed PREVIR model achieves a True Positive Ratio (TPR) up to 100% and an average False Positive Ratio (FPR) of 35%. The comparative analysis shows that PREVIR’s efficiency is 20% better on average in the prevention of malicious packets as compared to the state-of-the-art models.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
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Jayadev, V., Moradpoor, N., & Petrovski, A. (2024) · International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES) · doi:10.1145/3664476.3670927 · Cited by 17
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Jeyaram, G., Vidhya, V., Dhanaraj, R. K., & Alabdultif, A. (2026) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-026-36103-2 · Cited by 9
Supriya, D., & Krishna, A. V. P. (2025) · Journal of Umm Al-Qura University for Engineering and Architecture · doi:10.1007/s43995-025-00225-x · Cited by 2
Systematic Analysis of Common Cyber Attacks and Their Mitigation Techniques
Jain, L., & Bhushan, B. (2024) · International Conference on Emerging Technologies and Innovation for Sustainability (EmergIN) · doi:10.1109/emergin63207.2024.10961137 · Cited by 2
“It’s called Distributed Denial of Service attack [12].”
Sable, N. M., Sharma, V. K., & Manjre, B. M. (2025) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-87886-2_4 · Cited by 1
Intrusion Detection in VANETs: A Comparative Study of Machine Learning and Deep Learning Models
Abbasi, M., Almomani, L., Al-Khatib, O., & Elkhouly, A. (2025) · Lecture notes in networks and systems · doi:10.1007/978-981-96-9245-3_10 · Cited by 1
An optimized lightweight DDoS detection framework towards Internet of Vehicles
Liu, M., Yu, D., Ji, Y., Yang, P., & Cui, J. (2026) · International Conference on Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence Applications (MLAIA) · doi:10.1117/12.3110399
Optimized FT-Transformer Framework for DDoS Detection in Software-Defined Vehicular Networks
Liu, M., Wu, T., Yu, D., & Cui, J. (2026) · International Conference on Communication Networks and Machine Learning (CNML) · doi:10.1109/cnml68938.2026.11453025
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Metadata
- Authors
- Verma, A., Saha, R., Kumar, G., Conti, M., & Kim, T.-H.
- Affiliations
- Lovely Professional University (IN)
- University of Padua (IT)
- Chonnam National University (KR)
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2024
- Volume
- 12
- Pages
- 48301-48320
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4393305240
- Cited by
- 11
- References
- 49
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 4
- FWCI
- 1.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
- Keywords
- vehicular networks, DDoS attack prevention, DDoS attacks, logit model, LogitBoost, zero-day attacks, advanced persistent threats, network intrusion prevention, UDP flood, network traffic analysis
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