Scrutinizing Security in Industrial Control Systems: An Architectural Vulnerabilities and Communication Network Perspective
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Technological advancement plays a crucial role in our daily lives and constantly transforms the industrial sector. However, these technologies also introduce new security vulnerabilities to Industrial Control Systems (ICS). Attackers take advantage of these weaknesses to infiltrate the ICS environment. The size of the targeted industry and the attacker’s knowledge of the internal ICS environment are crucial factors in determining the degree of impact. Researchers and industry professionals have taken several initiatives to identify and address security problems in the ICS environment; however, to our knowledge, a comprehensive survey of this landscape has yet to be conducted. Existing surveys have limitations since they mainly focus on specific aspects of ICS security rather than covering the security aspects holistically. This paper aims to cover all aspects of security in ICS by classifying the ICS environment into its components, such as SCADA, PLC, DCS, RTU, HMI, MTU, etc. The paper then discusses the vulnerabilities in the modern ICS environment, including those of the specific components. The article also presents a classification of ICS-specific attack types. Furthermore, the study examines real-world attack scenarios in the industrial critical infrastructure sectors, including energy, power, water, and wastewater. This study provides an in-depth analysis of ICS security that empowers researchers and industry practitioners to comprehend the complexities of ICS security and to strengthen the ICS environment’s resilience proactively.
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Citations
Cites
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“Authors in [32] provided a brief survey on CPS. Recently, authors in [33] presented a comprehensive survey on cyber security in CPS, but it is limited to CPS. Authors have presented another survey [34] which is on IoT based on CPS. Authors in [35] studied the survey on IIoT security from blockchain…”
BackgroundA survey of intrusion detection techniques for cyber-physical systems
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Secure communications over insecure channels
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“Insecure Communication: Several already available ICS devices were manufactured for computer desktops and are complicated to implement in a resource-rich ICS environment [238], [239].”
BackgroundA Survey on Industrial Internet of Things: A Cyber-Physical Systems Perspective
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Vulnerability Assessment of AC State Estimation With Respect to False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks
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BackgroundDifferential Privacy Techniques for Cyber Physical Systems: A Survey
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“While authors in [71] studied the threats and defenses of wireless connectivity for CPS and IoT, A conceptual difference [72] is highlighted in which IoT emphasizes internet connectivity and identification for all types of components and devices.”
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“Authors in [64] presented a survey based on practical IoT systems [11], [69].”
BackgroundCybersecurity for industrial control systems: A survey
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The Cybersecurity Landscape in Industrial Control Systems
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“Authors in [5], [26], [27], and [28] studied that in an ICS environment, there is a significant shift in cyber-attack sources.”
Background
Cited by
(2025) · doi:10.1016/j.iot.2026.101938 · Cited by 31
Cao, Z., Liu, B., Gao, D., Zhou, D., Han, X., & Cao, J. (2025) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics14091843 · Cited by 7
“Under this architecture, ICSs achieve data sharing, knowledge sharing, and resource sharing, but the security boundaries become increasingly blurred, making them more susceptible to cyber attacks [4,5].”
RHAD: A Reinforced Heterogeneous Anomaly Detector for Robust Industrial Control System Security
Han, X., Niu, Y., Cao, Z., Zhou, D., & Liu, B. (2025) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics14122440 · Cited by 5
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Metadata
- Authors
- Aslam, M. M., Tufail, A., Apong, R. A. A. H. M., De Silva, L. C., & Raza, M. T.
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2024
- Volume
- 12
- Pages
- 67537-67573
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4396214384
- Cited by
- 51
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 8.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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- Aslam, M. M., Tufail, A., Apong, R. A. A. H. M., De Silva, L. C., & Raza, M. T. (2024). Scrutinizing Security in Industrial Control Systems: An Architectural Vulnerabilities and Communication Network Perspective. IEEE Access. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2024.3394848
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