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Cited by 9Security and Verification in ComputingDigital Rights Management and SecurityCryptographic Implementations and Security

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

TSGX: Defeating SGX Side Channel Attack with Support of TPM

Hongwei, Zhou, Zhipeng, Ke, Yuchen, Zhang, Dangyang, Wu, Jinhui, Yuan·2021·2021 Asia-Pacific Conference on Communications Technology and Computer Science (ACCTCS)
DOI 10.1109/acctcs52002.2021.00046
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Abstract

Intel SGX provides a new method for protecting private data in computer. However, the existence of SGX side channel attacks makes it possible for attackers to steal software internal data. In SGX side channel attacks, it is often necessary to restart the software repeatedly to observe the rule of software. So we give a new SGX defense method, which we call it as TSGX. TSGX combines TPM and SGX to build a reliable software restart counter, thereby preventing the software from being frequently started by SGX side channel attackers. The discussion showed that TSGX is able to effectively limit the number of software restart, making SGX side channel attacks more difficult to steal private data.

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Crossref · 10.1109/acctcs52002.2021.00046

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Research works printed but not linked: 11

  1. arnautox, 2016, SCONE: Secure Linux containers with Intel SGX, Proceedings of the USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI'02)
  2. suh, 2003, AEGIS: Architecture for Tamper-Evident and Tamper-Resistant Processing, Programming Languages and Systems
  3. 10.1145/1133058.1133063 · DOI
  4. xu, 2015, Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems, Security and Privacy, 640
  5. zhou, 0, Building tamper-resistant reboot counter without trusted running OS[C]// Advanced Information Management, Communicates, Electronic & Automation Control Conference, IEEE
  6. ohrimenko, 2016, Oblivious multiparty machine learning on trusted processors, 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security16), 619
  7. 2006, Trusted Computing Group, TCG TPM Specification Version 1 2
  8. lee, 2011, Inferring fine-grained control flow inside sgx enclaves with branch shadowing, Memory deduplication as a threat to the guest OS[C]//Proc of the 4th European Workshop on System Security
  9. wenchang, 2014, Dcfi-checker checking kernel dynamic control flow integrity with performance monitoring counter, 11, 31
  10. parno, 0, Memoir: Practical State Continuity for Protected Modules[C]// 2011 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, IEEE
  11. 10.1145/1294261.1294294 · DOI

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Metadata

Authors
Hongwei, Z., Zhipeng, K., Yuchen, Z., Dangyang, W., & Jinhui, Y.
Affiliations
  • PLA Information Engineering University (CN)
  • PLA National Defence University (CN)
Venue
2021 Asia-Pacific Conference on Communications Technology and Computer Science (ACCTCS)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2021-01
Pages
192-196
DOI
10.1109/acctcs52002.2021.00046
OpenAlex
W3162979535
Cited by
9
References
0
Citations by year
2024: 3 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 3
FWCI
1.04
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Asia-Pacific Conference on Communications Technology and Computer Science (ACCTCS) (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital Rights Management and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
Keywords
Intel SGX, side-channel attacks, Trusted Platform Module, data protection, trusted execution environments, attack defense

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