Model Evasion Attack on Intrusion Detection Systems using Adversarial Machine Learning
Abstract
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have a long history as an effective network defensive mechanism. The systems alert defenders of suspicious and / or malicious behavior detected on the network. With technological advances in AI over the past decade, machine learning (ML) has been assisting IDS to improve accuracy, perform better analysis, and discover variations of existing or new attacks. However, applications of ML algorithms have some reported weaknesses and in this research, we demonstrate how one of such weaknesses can be exploited against the workings of the IDS. The work presented in this paper is twofold: (1) we develop a ML approach for intrusion detection using Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) network and demonstrate the effectiveness of our model with two different network-based IDS datasets; and (2) we perform a model evasion attack against the built MLP network for IDS using an adversarial machine learning technique known as the Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) method. Our experimental results show that the model evasion attack is capable of significantly reducing the accuracy of the IDS, i.e., detecting malicious traffic as benign. Our findings support that neural network-based IDS is susceptible to model evasion attack, and attackers can essentially use this technique to evade intrusion detection systems effectively.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Communication overhead is likely to be the main bottleneck of FL, especially with larger deep learning models.
“The communication overhead is likely to be the main bottleneck of FL [30], [80], [81], especially with larger deep learning models.”
From Vulnerabilities in federated learning (2021) · cites this paper as [81]
The citation lists haven’t been fetched yet
References 48 · Cited by 86
- Authors
- Ayub, M. A., Johnson, W. A., Talbert, D. A., & Siraj, A.
- Affiliations
- Tennessee Technological University (US)
- Venue
- 2020 54th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2020-03
- Pages
- 1-6
- OpenAlex
- W3021340315
- Cited by
- 86
- References
- 48
- Citations by year
- 2026: 12 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 21 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 4
- FWCI
- 3.62
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Biomedical Engineering › Artificial Immune Systems Applications
- Keywords
- intrusion detection systems, adversarial learning, multilayer perceptron, neural network security, network traffic classification, malicious traffic detection, adversarial robustness
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review