The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Ukraine cyber-induced power outage: Analysis and practical mitigation strategies
Abstract
On December 23, 2015, a “temporary malfunction of the power supply” in three provinces in Ukraine resulted in power outages that lasted up to six hours and affected 225,000 customers. Following the event, an investigation identified evidence that several regional Ukraine power control systems had been compromised by cyber attacks. This was the first publicly documented successful cyber attack on an electric utility's control system. Both asset owners and government officials around the world now are asking, “What happened and could a similar cyber attack happen in our control systems?” This paper provides an analysis of the Ukraine cyber attack, including how the malicious actors gained access to the control system, what methods the malicious actors used to explore and map the control system, a detailed description of the December 23, 2015 attacks, and methods used by the malicious actors to erase their activities and make remediation more difficult. We then present a detailed description of securing utility power system control systems based on best practices, including control system network design, whitelisting techniques, monitoring and logging, and personnel education. The paper concludes with a discussion of mitigation methods and recommendations that would have protected the Ukraine control system and alerted personnel in advance of the cyber attack.
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“However, the security aspect of ICS and SCADA systems was not considered a global issue until the discovery of the Stuxnet worm, developed in 2010 with the specific purpose of targeting ICS [170], and the Shamoon virus, responsible for the attack on Saudi Aramco, the world's largest oil company, caused disruption on global energy market [171].”
From SCADA Systems With Focus on Continuous Manufacturing and Steel Industry: A Survey on Architectures, Standards, Challenges and Industry 5.0 (2022) · cites this paper as [171]
Citations
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Self-citationCybersecurity best practices for creating resilient control systems
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Self-citation
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Syed, A. S., Sierra-Sosa, D., Kumar, A., & Elmaghraby, A. (2021) · Smart Cities · doi:10.3390/smartcities4020024 · Cited by 527
Challenges and Opportunities in Securing the Industrial Internet of Things
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Adversarial Attacks Against Network Intrusion Detection in IoT Systems
Qiu, H., Dong, T., Zhang, T., Lu, J., Memmi, G., & Meikang Qiu, A. (2020) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.3048038 · Cited by 334
Shi, Z., Yao, W., Li, Z., Zeng, L., Zhao, Y., Zhang, R., Tang, Y., & Wen, J. (2020) · Applied Energy · doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2020.115733 · Cited by 327
Abdelkader, S. M., Amissah, J., Kinga, S., Mugerwa, G., Ebinyu, E., Mansour, D. A., Bajaj, M., Blažek, V., & Prokop, L. (2024) · Results in Engineering · doi:10.1016/j.rineng.2024.102647 · Cited by 193
Metadata
- Authors
- Whitehead, D. E., Owens, K., Gammel, D., & Smith, J.
- Affiliations
- Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories (United States) (US)
- Venue
- 2017 70th Annual Conference for Protective Relay Engineers (CPRE)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2017-04
- Pages
- 1-8
- OpenAlex
- W2766130346
- Cited by
- 272
- References
- 5
- Citations by year
- 2026: 43 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 53 · 2023: 45 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 23 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 17.13
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Conference for Protective Relay Engineers (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Keywords
- power outages, control system security, whitelisting, network design, attack mitigation, critical infrastructure protection
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