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Automated Analysis of Diffie-Hellman Protocols and Advanced Security Properties
Abstract
We present a general approach for the symbolic analysis of security protocols that use Diffie-Hellman exponentiation to achieve advanced security properties. We model protocols as multiset rewriting systems and security properties as first-order formulas. We analyze them using a novel constraint-solving algorithm that supports both falsification and verification, even in the presence of an unbounded number of protocol sessions. The algorithm exploits the finite variant property and builds on ideas from strand spaces and proof normal forms. We demonstrate the scope and the effectiveness of our algorithm on non-trivial case studies. For example, the algorithm successfully verifies the NAXOS protocol with respect to a symbolic version of the eCK security model.
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Citations
Cited by
The TAMARIN Prover for the Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols
Meier, S., Schmidt, B., Cremers, C., & Basin, D. (2013) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-39799-8_48 · Cited by 657
Self-citationFIDO Gets Verified: A Formal Analysis of the Universal Authentication Framework Protocol
Feng, H., Guan, J., Li, H., Pan, X., & Zhao, Z. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2022.3217259 · Cited by 13
Metadata
- Authors
- Schmidt, B., Meier, S., Cremers, C., & Basin, D.
- Venue
- 2012 IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2012-06
- Pages
- 78-94
- ISSN
- 1063-6900 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2002789557
- Cited by
- 223
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 11.04
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Automated Analysis of Diffie-Hellman Protocols and Advanced Security Properties. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/csf.2012.25
- The paper
- Schmidt, B., Meier, S., Cremers, C., & Basin, D. (2012). Automated Analysis of Diffie-Hellman Protocols and Advanced Security Properties. 2012 IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations Symposium. https://doi.org/10.1109/csf.2012.25
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