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On Power Splitting Games in Distributed Computation: The Case of Bitcoin Pooled Mining

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Luu, Loi, Saha, Ratul, Parameshwaran, Inian, Saxena, Prateek, Hobor, Aquinas · 2015 · 2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium

Abstract

Several new services incentivize clients to compete in solving large computation tasks in exchange for financial rewards. This model of competitive distributed computation enables every user connected to the Internet to participate in a game in which he splits his computational power among a set of competing pools -- the game is called a computational power splitting game. We formally model this game and show its utility in analyzing the security of pool protocols that dictate how financial rewards are shared among the members of a pool. As a case study, we analyze the Bitcoin crypto currency which attracts computing power roughly equivalent to billions of desktop machines, over 70% of which is organized into public pools. We show that existing pool reward sharing protocols are insecure in our game-theoretic analysis under an attack strategy called the "block withholding attack". This attack is a topic of debate, initially thought to be ill-incentivized in today's pool protocols: i.e., causing a net loss to the attacker, and later argued to be always profitable. Our analysis shows that the attack is always well-incentivized in the long-run, but may not be so for a short duration. This implies that existing pool protocols are insecure, and if the attack is conducted systematically, Bitcoin pools could lose millions of dollars worth in months. The equilibrium state is a mixed strategy -- that is -- in equilibrium all clients are incentivized to probabilistically attack to maximize their payoffs rather than participate honestly. As a result, the Bitcoin network is incentivized to waste a part of its resources simply to compete.

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Metadata

Authors
Luu, L., Saha, R., Parameshwaran, I., Saxena, P., & Hobor, A.
Venue
2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2015-07
Volume
2015
Pages
397-411
ISSN
1063-6900 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2129763443
Cited by
161
References
0
FWCI
13.45
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
bronze

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: On Power Splitting Games in Distributed Computation: The Case of Bitcoin Pooled Mining. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/csf.2015.34
The paper
Luu, L., Saha, R., Parameshwaran, I., Saxena, P., & Hobor, A. (2015). On Power Splitting Games in Distributed Computation: The Case of Bitcoin Pooled Mining. 2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium. https://doi.org/10.1109/csf.2015.34

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