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On Power Splitting Games in Distributed Computation: The Case of Bitcoin Pooled Mining
Open accessAbstract
Several new services incentivize clients to compete in solving large computation tasks in exchange for financial rewards. This model of competitive distributed computation enables every user connected to the Internet to participate in a game in which he splits his computational power among a set of competing pools -- the game is called a computational power splitting game. We formally model this game and show its utility in analyzing the security of pool protocols that dictate how financial rewards are shared among the members of a pool. As a case study, we analyze the Bitcoin crypto currency which attracts computing power roughly equivalent to billions of desktop machines, over 70% of which is organized into public pools. We show that existing pool reward sharing protocols are insecure in our game-theoretic analysis under an attack strategy called the "block withholding attack". This attack is a topic of debate, initially thought to be ill-incentivized in today's pool protocols: i.e., causing a net loss to the attacker, and later argued to be always profitable. Our analysis shows that the attack is always well-incentivized in the long-run, but may not be so for a short duration. This implies that existing pool protocols are insecure, and if the attack is conducted systematically, Bitcoin pools could lose millions of dollars worth in months. The equilibrium state is a mixed strategy -- that is -- in equilibrium all clients are incentivized to probabilistically attack to maximize their payoffs rather than participate honestly. As a result, the Bitcoin network is incentivized to waste a part of its resources simply to compete.
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Cited by
A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues of Bitcoin
Conti, M., Sandeep Kumar, E., Lal, C., & Ruj, S. (2018) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2018.2842460 · Cited by 1,116
“[48] present a game-theoretic approach to analyzing effects of block withholding attack on mining pools.”
BackgroundA Survey on Consensus Mechanisms and Mining Strategy Management in Blockchain Networks
Wang, W., Hoang, D. T., Hu, P., Xiong, Z., Niyato, D., Wang, P., Wen, Y., & Kim, D. I. (2019) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2019.2896108 · Cited by 995
Stubborn Mining: Generalizing Selfish Mining and Combining with an Eclipse Attack
Nayak, K., Kumar, S., Miller, A., & Shi, E. (2016) · 2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2016.32 · Cited by 481
Eyal, I. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.13 · Cited by 376
Exploring the Attack Surface of Blockchain: A Comprehensive Survey
Saad, M., Spaulding, J., Njilla, L., Kamhoua, C., Shetty, S., Nyang, D., & Mohaisen, D. (2020) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2020.2975999 · Cited by 337
Metadata
- Authors
- Luu, L., Saha, R., Parameshwaran, I., Saxena, P., & Hobor, A.
- Venue
- 2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2015-07
- Volume
- 2015
- Pages
- 397-411
- ISSN
- 1063-6900 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2129763443
- Cited by
- 161
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 13.45
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Luu, L., Saha, R., Parameshwaran, I., Saxena, P., & Hobor, A. (2015). On Power Splitting Games in Distributed Computation: The Case of Bitcoin Pooled Mining. 2015 IEEE 28th Computer Security Foundations Symposium. https://doi.org/10.1109/csf.2015.34
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