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Cited by 967

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An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on prolog rules

Blanchet, B.·2005·Proceedings. 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2001.
DOI 10.1109/csfw.2001.930138
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Abstract

We present a new automatic cryptographic protocol verifier based on a simple representation of the protocol by Prolog rules, and on a new efficient algorithm that determines whether a fact can be proved from these rules or not. This verifier proves secrecy properties of the protocols. Thanks to its use of unification, it avoids the problem of the state space explosion. Another advantage is that we do not need to limit the number of runs of the protocol to analyze it. We have proved the correctness of our algorithm, and have implemented it. The experimental results show that many examples of protocols of the literature, including Skeme [24], can be analyzed by our tool with very small resources: the analysis takes from less than 0.1 s for simple protocols to 23 s for the main mode of Skeme. It uses less than 2 Mb of memory in our tests. 1.

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Metadata

Authors
Blanchet, B.
Venue
Proceedings. 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2001.
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2005-08-29
Pages
82-96
ISSN
1063-6900 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1109/csfw.2001.930138
OpenAlex
W2114189125
Cited by
967
References
0
FWCI
29.25
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on prolog rules. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/csfw.2001.930138
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Blanchet, B. (2005). An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on prolog rules. Proceedings. 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1109/csfw.2001.930138

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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