The DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An efficient cryptographic protocol verifier based on prolog rules
Abstract
We present a new automatic cryptographic protocol verifier based on a simple representation of the protocol by Prolog rules, and on a new efficient algorithm that determines whether a fact can be proved from these rules or not. This verifier proves secrecy properties of the protocols. Thanks to its use of unification, it avoids the problem of the state space explosion. Another advantage is that we do not need to limit the number of runs of the protocol to analyze it. We have proved the correctness of our algorithm, and have implemented it. The experimental results show that many examples of protocols of the literature, including Skeme [24], can be analyzed by our tool with very small resources: the analysis takes from less than 0.1 s for simple protocols to 23 s for the main mode of Skeme. It uses less than 2 Mb of memory in our tests. 1.
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Cites
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Cited by
The AVISPA Tool for the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications
Armando, A., Basin, D., Boichut, Y., Chevalier, Y., Compagna, L., Cuellar, J., Drielsma, P. H., Heám, P. C., Kouchnarenko, O., Mantovani, J., et al. (2005) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11513988_27 · Cited by 1,343
The Scyther Tool: Verification, Falsification, and Analysis of Security Protocols
Cremers, C. J. F. (2008) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-70545-1_38 · Cited by 757
The TAMARIN Prover for the Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols
Meier, S., Schmidt, B., Cremers, C., & Basin, D. (2013) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-39799-8_48 · Cited by 657
Automated Security Protocol Analysis With the AVISPA Tool
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Blanchet, B., Abadi, M., & Fournet, C. (2008) · The Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming · doi:10.1016/j.jlap.2007.06.002 · Cited by 346
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Blanchet, B.
- Venue
- Proceedings. 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2001.
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2005-08-29
- Pages
- 82-96
- ISSN
- 1063-6900 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2114189125
- Cited by
- 967
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 29.25
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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